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THE CONSTITUTIONAL INVALIDITY OF
CONVICTIONS IMPOSED BY
DEATH-QUALIFIED JURIES*
Welsh S. Whitet
In the landmark case of Furman v. Georgia1 the Supreme Court
held that under a system which allows a jury absolute discretion to
decide when capital punishment shall be imposed, "the imposition
and carrying out of the death penalty.. . constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. ' '2 Thus, Furman apparently eliminates the death penalty as it is
presently applied in this country.3 Despite its far-reaching impact, however, Furman has left a number of questions unanswered. Perhaps the
most important is the validity of convictions reached prior to Furman
by juries chosen on the basis of their willingness to impose capital
punishment.
Prior to 1968, it was almost universal practice for a state to authorize the exclusion of veniremen who evidenced conscientious scru• The author expresses his gratitude to Ross Parker, a second-year student at the
University of Pittsburgh Law School, for his invaluable assistance in performing the research and editing necessary for the preparation of this Article.
t"Associate Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh. B.A. 1962, Harvard University;
LL.B. 1965, University of Pennsylvania.

1 408 U.S. 238 (1972).

2 Id. at 239-40. The statutes under which the death sentences before the Court were
imposed provided that upon a finding of guilt as to the specified crime, the jury had
absolute discretion to determine whether or not a sentence of death should be imposed.
See GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1005 (Supp. 1971) (murder); id. § 26-1802 (Supp. 1971) (rape); TEx.

PENAL CODE ANN.art. 1189 (1961) (rape).
3 Two Justices dearly expressed the view that capital punishment may not be im-

posed under any circumstances. See 408 U.S. at 257 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 814
(Marshall, J., concurring). The other three concurring Justices explicitly noted that they
were only ruling on the legitimacy of capital punishment as applied pursuant to the
specific statutes before them. Id. at 240 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 806 (Stewart, J.,
concurring); id. at 310 (White, J., concurring). Each of these three Justices distinguished
legislative schemes under which the death penalty would be a mandatory punishment for
a specific crime. Id. at 257 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 808-09 (Stewart, J., concurring);
id. at 810-11 (White, J., concurring). Thus, the opinions implied that the death penalty
could be imposed, if at all, only in those extremely rare situations in which a statute imposes a mandatory penalty of death. See id. at 807 nn.8-6 (Stewart, J., concurring). In such
cases, however, the rarity of imposition of the penalty, combined with the absolute discretion of the jury, might well lead to a holding that the death penalty would constitute
cruel and unusual punishment under a traditional eighth amendment analysis. See, e.g.,
Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 849 (1910).
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pies against capital punishment. 4 In that year, however, the Supreme
Court, in Witherspoon v. Illinois,5 held that the practice of excluding
for cause veniremen who express reservations about capital punishment
was unconstitutional because the remaining pool of potential jurors
would be unduly biased in favor of imposing capital punishment on
the defendant.8
Both defense counsel and prosecutors recognize that the exclusion
of veniremen opposed to capital punishment favors the prosecution, not
only with respect to the penalty determination but also with respect
to the adjudication of guilt.7 In Witherspoon, the Court for the first
time dealt with the argument that the exclusion for cause of prospective jurors who had conscientious scruples against capital punishment
subjected the defendant to a "prosecution prone" jury in violation of
the accused's constitutional rights. Although it did not fully accept this
theory, contrary to several lower court opinions," the Court did not
unequivocally reject the argument. Rather, the Court issued an implicit
invitation to reassert the claim in a case where the evidence would more
clearly support the appellant's contention.9 Referring to the limited
scientific evidence presented in Witherspoon,o the Court stated:
4 See, e.g., Law of March 31, 1869, § 4, [1869] II. Laws 26th Gen. Assembly 113 (repealed 1963).
5 391 US. 510 (1968). But see Paramore v. State, 229 So. 2d 855 (Fla. 1969), vacated,
408 U.S. 935 (1972) (upholding exclusion of juror who stated that it "would be a little
hard" to bring in death penalty). See generally Comment, Jury Selection and the Death
Penalty: Witherspoon in the Lower Courts, 37 U. Cm. L. REv. 759 (1970).
6 [A] jury that must choose between life imprisonment and capital punishment
can do little more-and must do nothing less-than express the conscience of the
community on the ultimate question of life or death. Yet, in a nation less than
half of whose people believe in the death penalty, a jury composed of such people
cannot speak for the community. Culled of all who harbor doubts about the wisdom of capital punishment-of all who would be reluctant to pronounce the extreme penalty-such a jury can speak only for a distinct and dwindling minority.
Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519-20 (1968) (footnotes omitted).
7 For example, there have been situations in which prosecutors have sought to obtain a jury on which none of the members were opposed to capital punishment even
though they had no intention of asking the jury to impose the death penalty. See generally Oberer, Does Disqualification of Jurors for Scruples Against Capital Punishment
Constitute Denial of Fair Trial on the Issue of Guilt?, 39 TEXAs L. REv. 545, 555 (1961).
8 See, e.g., Springfield v. United States, 403 F.2d 572, 573 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (erroneously
stating that Witherspoon and its companion case, Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 US. 543
(1968), held that jury from which veniremen were improperly excluded because of their
views regarding death penalty can impartially determine guilt or innocence).
9 391 U.S. at 517-23. The nature of the Court's invitation was noted in a dissenting
opinion:
Mhe majority opinion goes out of its way to state that in some future case a defendant might well establish that a jury selected in the way the Illinois statute
here provides is "less than neutral with respect to guilt.".... This seems to me to
be but a thinly veiled warning to the States that they had better change their jury
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[T]he data adduced by the peitioner ...are too tentative and

fragmentary to establish that jurors not opposed to the death penalty tend to favor the prosecution in the determination of guilt. We
simply cannot conclude, either on the basis of the record now before us or as a matter of judicial notice, that the exclusion of jurors
opposed to capital punishment results in an unrepresentative jury
on the issue of guilt or substantially increases the risk of conviction.
In light of the presently available information, we are not prepared
to announce a per se constitutional rule requiring the reversal of
every conviction returned by a jury selected as this one was. 1
The Court underscored the significance of this language by adding
that even a defendant convicted by a jury which was selected with the
exclusion of jurors who "stated in advance of trial that they would not
even consider returning a verdict of death"' 2 "might still attempt to
establish that the jury was less than neutral with respect to guilt."'3
The Court's language indicated that if new statistical data strengthened
the contention that a jury selected by excluding those opposed to capital
punishment would be more likely than other juries to favor the prosecution, the question of whether such a jury was "neutral with respect
to guilt" would be ripe for reconsideration. Since the results of a number of post-Witherspoon studies are now available, 14 reconsideration of
the constitutional issue left unresolved in Witherspoon is possible.
Such a reconsideration is particularly appropriate at this time for
several reasons. First, if it can be demonstrated that the adjudications
of guilt in many capital cases were constitutionally invalid, or at least
constitutionally suspect, it would be unsupportable to allow any defendant-victim of a tainted verdict of this sort to be executed. Second,
and most significantly, the resolution of the issue could have tremendous impact on the thousands of pre-Furmancases in which defendants
were found guilty by death-qualified juries.' 5 If it can be shown that
selection procedures or face a decision by this Court that their murder convictions
have been obtained unconstitutionally.

Id. at 539 (Black, J., dissenting).
10 Id. at 517-18 n.10; see notes 18-26 and accompanying text infra.
11 391 U.S. at 517-18 (footnote omitted).
12 Id. at 520. Subsequent studies show that this is a significantly narrower class of
people than those who are opposed to capital punishment. The 1971 Harris Poll reveals
that 36% of the population is opposed to capital punishment, but only 23% of the population would be willing to state that as a member of a jury they would refuse to vote for
the death penalty under any circumstances. Louis Harris & Associates, Study No. 2016,
at 3a, d (1971) (on file at NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, 10 Columbus
Circle, Suite 2030, New York, N.Y. 10019) [hereinafter cited as 1971 Harris Poll].
13 391 U.S. at 520 n.18 (emphasis in original).
14 See note 26 infra.
15 Adjudications of guilt were rendered by death-qualified juries not only in cases in
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juries which were selected because of their favorable attitude toward
capital punishment were made up of individuals who were also unduly
biased toward the prosecution on the more general question of the defendant's guilt, then the validity of the convictions which those juries
rendered is suddenly thrown into question.1
After referring to three of the five existing studies on the prosecution-proneness issue, 17 the Witherspoon majority concluded that the
data adduced from these studies was "too tentative and fragmentary"' 8
to justify overturning the conviction at issue. This conclusion was based
partially upon defense counsel's failure to submit the studi s at the trial
court level as evidence of prosecution proneness, which prevented the
Court from reviewing fully the substantive validity and accuracy of the
which defendants were unconstitutionally condemned to death, but also in many of the
much greater number of cases in which defendants were sentenced to a lesser punishment
after being found guilty by a death-qualified jury of some crime in which the imposition
of the death penalty was a possibility.
Despite the ruling in Furman, some states are continuing to seek the death penalty
under their present statutes. See note 152 infra. Presumably, the constitutional validity of
adjudications of guilt rendered by death-qualified juries will also be a significant issue in
these cases.
10 The issue of a jury's "prosecution proneness" arises in a slightly different context
under mandatory capital punishment statutes since the states may plausibly argue that
their interest in maintaining capital punishment should allow them to exclude those
veniremen whose "attitude toward [the mandatory] death penalty would prevent them
from making an impartial decision as to the defendant's guilt." Witherspoon v. Illinois,
391 U.S. 510, 522-23 n.21 (1968). Assuming that it could be shown that the exclusion of
these veniremen would lead to the selection of a jury which was not constitutionally neutral with respect to the determination of guilt,
the question would then arise whether the State's interest in submitting the penalty issue to a jury capable of imposing capital punishment may be vindicated at
the expense of the defendant's interest in a completely fair determination of guilt
or innocence ....
Id. at 520 n.18. A more detailed discussion of such statutes, however, is beyond the scope of
this Article.
17 Id. at 517 n.10, discussing F. Goldberg, Attitude Toward Capital Punishment and
Behavior as a Juror in Simulated Capital Cases (unpublished manuscript, Morehouse College, undated); IV. Wilson, Belief in Capital Punishment and Jury Performance (unpublished manuscript, University of Texas 1968); H. Zeisel, Some Insights into the Operation
of Criminal Juries 42 (confidential first draft, University of Chicago, November 1957).
While all of the studies referred to by the Court were unpublished at the time Witherspoon was decided, two of them have since been published. See H. ZEIsE, Soma DATA ON
JUROR ATTuDEs TOWARD CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (1968); Goldberg, Toward Expansion of

Witherspoon Capital Punishment Scruples, Jury Bias and Use of Psychological Data To
Raise Presumptions in the Law, 5 HARv. Cry. RGrrs-Civ. IBa. L. REv. 53 (1969). In addition, a fifth study, unpublished at the time of the Witherspoon decision and not mentioned in the Court's opinion, has since been published. See Bronson, On the Conviction
Proneness and Representativeness of the Death-Qualified Jury: An Empirical Study of
Colorado Veniremen, 42 U. COLO. L. Rav. 1 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Bronson].
18 891 U.S. at 517.
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studies' conclusions."9 Thus, without disparaging the studies, the Court
simply refused to speculate on their relevance and to use their generalizations to resolve the specific issues raised by the defendant's claim.20
The amicus brief of the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund,
cited with approval by the Court,21 noted that even if these studies did
show that juries selected with the exclusion of jurors opposed to the
death penalty would be more likely to favor the prosecution, evidence
concerning several other vital issues would still be lacking.22 For example, the NAACP claimed that the Court would not possess any reliable
information concerning:
(1) what proportion of the population, of the community, is
"scrupled" under various possible exclusionary standards . . . ;
(2) to what extent disqualifying scruples are disproportionately
found in certain demographic groups-women, Negroes, laborers,
members of particular churches or religious denomination [sic], etc.
-with the result that death-qualification disproportionately frequently excludes persons in those groups

. .

. ; (8) to what extent

the class of scrupled persons is characterized by common attributes,
attitudes and perspectives other than opposition to capital punishment, and so takes on distinctive in-group identity... ; (4) to what
extent these shared attributes, attitudes, and perspectives include
personality factors that dispose scrupled jurors to greater humanity,
compassion, impunitiveness and objectivity than the class of deathqualified jurors... ; (5) to what extent the common characteristics,
which differentiate scrupled and non-scrupled jurors as classes, involve intellectual qualities that dispose scrupled jurors to greater
attentiveness, responsibility, and capacity for relevant differentiation, as in the grading of offenses ...

; (6) to what extent these

common characteristics involve attitudes toward crime, courts, corrections and other matters that dispose scrupled jurors to greater
impartiality, fairness and rationality in fact-finding and the fixing
of penalties ....

Since Witherspoon, fuller details concerning the pre-Witherspoon
studies2 4 as well as several other studies have been published. 25 Although
19 The Court refused to take judicial notice of their findings. Id. at 517 n.11.
20 Id.
21 Id.

22 Brief for NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. and National Office
for the Rights of the Indigent as Amicus Curiae at 54, Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 US. 510

(1968).
28 Id. at 54-55.
24 See note 17 supra,
25 See Jurow, New Data on the Effect of a "Death Qualified" Jury on the Guilt
Determination Process, 84 HARv. L. Rav. 567 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Jurow]; Rokeach
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lower courts which have considered the prosecution-proneness issue
after Witherspoon have been reluctant to recognize these studies, 26 the
post-Witherspoon findings enlarge the relevant statistical data in several
important respects.
In order to assess the impact of the new studies, this Article will
27
examine the data obtained from three of the post-Witherspoon studies.
The results of the other studies generally corroborate the data presented
in this section.

28

& McLellan, Dogmatism and the Death Penalty: A Reinterpretation of the Duquesne Poll
Data, 8 DUQUESNE L. Rv. 125 (1970); Comment, Witherspoon-Will the Due Process
Clause Further Regulate the Imposition of the Death Penalty?, 1 DuQUESNE L. REv. 414
(1969); 1971 Harris Poll.
26 The response of lower courts to a post-Witherspoon assertion that a death-qualified
jury is prosecution-prone is exemplified in United States ex rel. Townsend v. Twomey,
452 F.2d 350 (7th Cir. 1972), rev'g 322 F. Supp. 158 (N.D. ill. E.D. 1971). In Townsend, the
district court held a hearing on the prosecution proneness of a death-qualified jury. After
hearing testimony on this issue from Professor Zeisel and considering the results of
several studies, including the post-Witherspoon Bronson study (see note 17 supra), the
lower court found that the adjudication of guilt was constitutionally tainted because it
was rendered by a prosecution-prone jury. Completely disregarding the testimony of Professor Zeisel, the court of appeals overruled this finding:
The Supreme Court in Witherspoon concluded that the data contained in these
studies "are too tentative and fragmentary to establish that jurors not opposed to
the death penalty tend to favor the prosecution in the determination of guilt."...
The court below reached an opposite conclusion based on virtually the same
data considered by the Supreme Court in Witherspoon. The only new study was
the one by Bronson. We do not find this to be sufficient to overcome the determination reached by the Supreme Court that the data are "too tentative and
fragmentary" to establish [the defendant's] claim.
452 F.2d at 363 (citation omitted). For other post-Witherspoon cases which have summarily
rejected the prosecution-proneness argument, see People v. Terry, 2 Cal. 3d 362, 466 P.2d
961, 85 Cal. Rptr. 409 (1970); People v. Brawley, I Cal. 3d 277, 461 P.2d 361, 82 Cal. Rptr.
161 (1969); In re Eli, 71 Cal. 2d 214, 454 P.2d 337, 77 Cal. Rptr. 665, cert. denied, 396 U.S.
1020, rehearing denied, 397 U.S. 929 (1969); In re Arguello, 71 Cal. 2d 13, 452 P.2d 921, 76
Cal. Rptr. 633 (1969); Campbell v. State, 227 So. 2d 873 (Fla. 1969), cert. dismissed, 400 U.S.
801 (1970); Zimmer v. State, 206 Kan. 304, 477 P.2d 971 (1971). But see State v. Benjamin,
254 La. 49, 222 So. 2d 853 (1969) (exclusion of veniremen in violation of Witherspoon
denied defendant fair and impartial trial).
27 See notes 12, 15 & 25 supra. By so limiting the focus, this Article does not imply
that a more complete factual picture could not be obtained through use of additional data
contained in these and other post-Witherspoon studies, or through the use of testimony
by the experts who undertook any of the studies. However, it seems plausible to assert
that this limited focus will give a reasonably sound indication of the factual picture which
could be presented by expert testimony at an evidentiary hearing or judicially noticed by
a court on the basis of those results which are or soon will be within the public domain.
The complete results from the 1971 Harris Poll have not yet been made public. The
results are in the custody of the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, 10 Columbus Circle, Suite 2030, New York, N.Y. 10019. The other studies referred to have been
released, however, and are therefore subject to judicial notice.
28 See note 56 infra.
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A.

PosT-Witherspoon STUDIES

The Jurow Study

In this post-Witherspoon experiment, 29 211 employees of Sperry
Rand Corporation were given various tests to determine their attitude
toward capital punishment.30 As part of the tests, the subjects were
shown movies of two murder trials, one involving a shooting in the
course of a liquor store holdup and the other involving a stabbing which
occurred during a rape. The test subjects were asked to state how they
would vote with respect to guilt if they were on the jury in each case.
Some of the results provide extremely significant corroboration of the
prosecution-proneness theory.3 1 A highly significant statistical relationship existed between a subject's answer on the issue of capital punishment and his determination of guilt or innocence with respect to the
liquor store holdup.3 2 This relationship provides strong evidence that
a positive attitude toward capital punishment increases the likelihood
that a juror will favor the prosecution as to the determination of
guilt. Perhaps even more significant is the finding that, with respect to
both mock-trial situations, those people who answered the test questions
in a manner which would allow the state to excuse them for cause under
Witherspoon3 were far more likely than other people to favor the defendant on the issue of guilt.34 With respect to the liquor store holdup,
44.7 percent of the people who would not be excluded under Wither29 See note 25 supra.

30 Jurow 577. These tests included a Capital Punishment Attitude Questionnaire
(CPAQ (A)) test, which presented a choice of five possible attitudes towards capital punishment, and the CPAQ(B) test, which asked each subject to assume he was on a jury and
presented a choice of five possible statements concerning the circumstances under which
he would vote for the imposition of capital punishment. These choices included a statement which under Witherspoon would be sufficient to authorize a prospective juror's
exclusion for cause in a capital case. Id. at 577-79. A further test was given to measure the
subject's authoritarianism and to elicit his attitude toward the presumption of innocence
and the importance of safeguarding constitutional rights. Id. at 580, 603-04.
In Witherspoon, the Supreme Court repeatedly stated that its holding was not intended to bar a state from seeking to exclude prospective jurors who "would automatically
vote against the imposition of capital punishment without regard to any evidence that
might be developed at the trial of the case before them." 391 U.S. at 522 n.21. Question 1
of the CPAQ(B) test was properly designed to identify those people who would be excluded
under this exclusionary standard: "I could not vote for the death penalty regardless of
the facts and circumstances of the case." Jurow 599.
31 See notes 34-38 and accompanying text infra.
32 Jurow 582-85.
33 See note 30 supra.
34 Jurow 588.
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spoon would vote to convict, but only 33.3 percent of the people who
would be excluded would do so.385 For the rape-murder, the conviction
rate was 60 percent for those who would not be excluded under Witherspoon and 42.9 percent for those who would.3 6 The results from other
tests in the Jurow study showed that a subject's responses to a legal
attitude questionnaire provide an extremely reliable indicator of his
likelihood to vote for acquittal or conviction in a particular case3" and
that "[t]he more a subject is in favor of capital punishment, the more
likely he is to be politically conservative, authoritarian and punitive in
38
assigning penalties upon conviction."
Since the Jurow study appears to be the most carefully analyzed
study yet conducted, it is important to discuss the three limitations on
the validity of the study's conclusions noted by its author. With regard
to the possible criticism that his sample was unrepresentative, Jurow
admitted that "[t]he sample was overwhelmingly white, fairly welleducated, and had a high median income."3 9 When the subjects of the
Jurow study were compared to those selected through sampling techniques used in the Harris Poll, it appeared that the following groups
were underrepresented: blacks, women, people with low incomes,
people with limited education, and non-Roman Catholics. 40 Significantly, each of the underrepresented groups is substantially more opposed to the death penalty and, according to Harris, less prosecutionprone than the overrepresented groups in the Jurow study.41 Thus, the
sample selected by Jurow would be expected to underestimate significantly the degree to which a typical selection of jurors would be opposed to the death penalty and understate the extent of such jurors'
prosecution proneness.
A second limitation of the Jurow study is that the findings reflect
35 Id. at 583.

36 Id.
37 Id. at 593. Generally, a subject's agreement with a proprosecution statement was
assumed to indicate an increased likelihood that he would vote in favor of the prosecution
in a mock-trial situation.
38 Id. at 588.
39 Id. at 577. But cf. id. at 596-98.
40 See notes 52-53 and accompanying text infra.
41 The following is a comparison of the opposition to the death penalty, according to
the 1971 Harris Poll, between groups overrepresented in the Jurow sample and those
underrepresented: whites--33%, blacks (comprising only 1% of Jurow's sample (Jurow
578))-52%; high school graduates-29%, non-high school graduates (comprising only
6% of Jurow's sample (id.))-41%; the median income of the Jurow sample ($12,500 (id.))31%, a median income under $6,000-39%; men-30%, women (comprising only 24% of
Jurow's sample (id.))--42%; Roman Catholics (comprising almost half the sample (id.))31%; non-Roman Catholics-38%. 1971 Harris Poll 3a.
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individual predispositions rather than group interaction. The likelihood that the airing of a different opinion would lead an individual to
change his mind with respect to a determination of guilt or innocence
was not explored. However, the force of this limitation is mitigated by
Professor Hans Zeisel's study, which indicates that when there is a difference of opinion among jurors on the first ballot, the verdict will be
rendered in favor of the first ballot majority over ninety percent of the
time. 42 This evidence suggests that a juror's original predisposition as
to guilt or innocence is of crucial importance in determining the outcome of a trial.
Finally, the most significant problem with this or with any study
43
is that "no experiment can completely simulate a real life situation."
Although efforts were made to involve the subjects in the mock trials
they were to judge, their awareness that no real consequences would
attach to their decisions could be expected to differentiate the experiment sharply from a trial in which members of the jury are presumably
cognizant of the extremely significant impact of their decision. 44 This
limitation is, of course, inevitable, and must be considered in assessing
the legal significance of all studies of the prosecution proneness of
death-qualified juries.
B.

The Bronson Study
In this pre-Witherspoon study,45 published subsequent to Witherspoon, a questionnaire was submitted to 1,117 prospective jurors selected from jury lists in several counties of Colorado. In the questionnaire, subjects were asked whether they strongly opposed, opposed,
favored, or strongly favored the death penalty. They were then asked
to pretend that they were serving on a jury and to indicate their agreement or disagreement with five statements, each of which was designed
to indicate a proneness to convict. 46 The results showed a direct, highly
42 H. ZEisnL, supra note 17, at 120. Moreover, the 1971 Harris Poll indicates that
jurors opposed to capital punishment have a disproportionate tendency to cling to their

opinions as to guilt in the face of opposition from other jurors. See 1971 Harris Poll 11.
43 Jurow 596 (footnote omitted).
44 See generally Orne, On the Social Psychology of the Psychological Experiment: With
ParticularReference to Demand Characteristicsand Their Implications, 17 Ahr. PSYCHOLOcISr 776 (1962); Rosenthal, On the Social Psychology of the Psychological Experiments: The
Experimenter's Hypothesis as Unintended Determinant of Experimental Results, 51 Ahr.
SCIENTIST 268 (1963).
45 See note 17 supra.
46 The five statements used in the experiment were:

1) If the police have arrested an individual and the district attorney has brought
him to trial, there is good reason to believe that the man on trial is guilty.
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significant statistical relationship between the extent to which a person
favors the death penalty and the extent to which he or she will be prone
to convict. 47 In addition, the study showed that certain groups are
significantly more likely to oppose capital punishment than other segments of the population. Such groups include nonwhites-particularly
8
blacks4 '-women,
Jews, Catholics, agnostics, housewives, unskilled
workers, those with income of less than $5,000 per year, and Democrats.4 9
The results of Professor Edward Bronson's study strongly confirm
Jurow's findings, primarily because a larger sample more clearly reflecting the actual jury population was utilized.5" The Bronson data
also provide substantial evidence that jurors opposed to capital punishment are not spread randomly throughout the population, but are concentrated within certain definable groups. 51
C.

The HarrisPoll
Selected to reflect an accurate cross-section of the total population,
2,068 people were asked questions designed to elicit their attitudes on
both capital punishment and legal issues generally. 52 The subjects were
2) If the person on trial does not testify at his trial, there is good reason to
believe that he is concealing guilt.
3) Concerning the high level of violent crime in ghetto areas, this level of violent
crime could be reduced if the courts would convict alleged law-breakers more
often.
4) The courts are far too technical in protecting the so-called constitutional
rights of those involved in criminal activity.
5) The plea of insanity is a loophole allowing too many guilty men to go free.
Bronson 7 (footnotes omitted).
47 Id. at 8-9. The probability that the two variables measuring conviction proneness
and attitude toward the death penalty are associated by chance is less than 1 in 1,000. Id.
at 8-9 n.35.
48 Whereas 80% of the blacks tested opposed or strongly opposed capital punishment,
only 39.7% of the white population did so. Id. at 20.
49 Id. at 21, 24-25, 27, 30. A possible criticism of this study is that any evaluation of
a subject's proneness to convict may be inaccurate because of the uncertainty of the
extent to which a person's stated disagreement with a libertarian statement will accurately
reflect his vote as a member of a jury in a particular criminal case. However, the force
of this criticism is mitigated by Jurow's finding that a subject's profile on a "legal attitude" test, which also purports to test prosecution proneness, will in fact give an extremely accurate indication of a subject's predilection to convict in the mock-trial situation.
See Jurow 580.
50 Jurow 598. Although the Bronson study was post-Witherspoon, the subjects were
not expressly tested on whether they could make a statement which would allow their
exclusion for cause under the Witherspoon standard. See Bronson 12.
51 For an elaboration of the elements of a legally recognized group, see notes 65-90
and accompanying text infra.
52 See note 12 supra.
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then shown a set of cards, each containing the facts of a criminal case,
and were asked to vote guilty or not guilty on the basis of these facts.
Taken together, the results of the attitude questioning and verdict balloting indicated that in every fact situation, subjects who could vote for
the death penalty were more likely to convict than those who would
never vote for the death penalty (and therefore could be properly excluded under Witherspoon).53 The results from other questions once
again demonstrated that people with relatively low scruples against
capital punishment share common attitudes which mark them as disproportionately authoritarian, conservative, and punitive. 54
In addition, the Harris Poll confirmed Bronson's finding that opposition to capital punishment is particularly pronounced in certain
segments of the population. Opposition was found to be significantly
more prevalent in blacks than whites-52 percent to 3 percent, women
than men-42 percent to 30 percent, and non-high school graduates
than high school graduates-41 percent to 32 percent. 55
Legal Questions Raised by the Studies
These studies indicate that the prosecution-proneness argument is
less "tentative and fragmentary" now than it was at the time WitherD.

53 1971 Harris Poll 3d. Four cases were presented. In the first case, involving the theft
of a typewriter, the conviction rate of those potential veniremen who would be subject to
exclusion under Witherspoon was nine percentage points lower than that of those who
would not be subject to exclusion-57% to 66%. Id. at 15. In the second and third cases,
involving, respectively, manslaughter and the assault of a police officer, the difference
between the two groups was seven points--67% to 74%, and 32% to 39%. Id. In the fourth
case, involving larceny of an automobile, the difference was four points--69% to 73%. Id.
54 Particularly instructive are figures comparing the percentage of low and high
scrupled jurors-that is, comparing the percentage of those jurors with slight and strong
conscientious or religious scruples against capital punishment-who agree with the
following statements: (1) Courts are contributing to a breakdown in law and order: low
scruples-43%, high scruples-18%; (2) Blacks are contributing to a breakdown in law
and order: low scruples-52%, high scruples-29%; (3) The "eye for an eye" approach in
criminal procedure is correct: low scruples-61%, high scruples-1%o; (4) The only
language most criminals understand is a good stiff prison sentence: low scruples-66%,
high scruples-41%; (5) As a juror how much would you trust the prosecutor? A lot: low
scruples-36%, high scruples-25o; (6) As a juror how much would you trust the
arresting police officer? A lot: low scruples-61%, high scruples-48%; (7) As a juror how
much would you trust the accused? A lot: low scruples-22%, high scruples-34%o; (8)
Defense attorneys are more likely to be dishonest because they're always trying to get
criminals off: low scruples-641, high scruples-40%; (9) If a defendant has a past
criminal record, chances are he is guilty or he would not be in court: low scruples-8%,
high scruples-21%; (10) Jurors should ignore the insanity defense because it is a loophole
allowing the guilty to go free: low scruples-74''o, high scruples-49%; (/l)If as a juror
you had read a newspaper article saying that the defendant had actually committed a
crime, although the judge said to ignore it, would you not find him innocent? Yes: low
scruples-21%, high scruples-10o. Id. at 5-6, 9, 11, 18-14.
55 Id. at 3a.
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spoon was decided."6 The new data provide relatively clear and reliable
information concerning almost all of the matters which were in need
of exploration in 1968. First, the proportion of the population subject
to exclusion under the various restrictive jury selection standards is
substantial; the most representative sampling suggests that approximately 23 percent of the population would now be excluded under the
standard approved in Witherspoon,57 while nearly 36 percent would
have been excluded under the previously valid pre-Witherspoon state
statutes barring those with conscientious scruples against capital punishment. 58 Second, potentially disqualifying scruples are disproportionately high in certain demographic groups, particularly blacks and
women.59 Finally, the people opposed to capital punishment share common attitudes on other legal and social matters, including questions
relating to the appropriate role of a juror in a criminal case. 60 It is particularly significant that people who would not be subject to exclusion
for their attitudes on capital punishment are more likely than their
scrupled counterparts to hold attitudes on the determination of guilt
61
which cast doubt upon their qualification to serve as jurors.
56 The findings from other studies, both pre-Witherspoon and post-Witherspoon,
generally confirm the conclusions of Jurow, Bronson, and the Harris Poll. See, e.g.,
H. ZEiSEL, supra note 17, at 10-17, 24-33 (pre-Witherspoon study showing scrupled jurors
likely to predominate among blacks, women, persons with low income, and highly-educated
persons, and showing from interviews scrupled jurors are more likely than others to vote
not guilty on divided first ballot); Goldberg, supra note 17, 5 HARV. Civ. RIcwrs-Cv. Lm.
L. R-v. at 60-62 (post-Witherspoon study showing nonstatistically significant tendency of
scrupled jurors to acquit more often than nonscrupled jurors).
57 1971 Harris Poll 3d. Jurow's study indicates that only 10% of the population
would be excluded under this test. Jurow 583. This discrepancy may be accounted for by
the paucity of black subjects and the overrepresentation of subjects in the Jurow study
who were well-educated and had a high median income. See note 40 and accompanying text
supra.
58 The Illinois statute, which was typical of those applied in many states prior to
Witherspoon, provided that a prospective juror in a capital case could be properly excused
for cause if he "state[s] that he has conscientious scruples against capital punishment, or
that he is opposed to the same." Law of March 31, 1869, § 4 [1869] Ill. Laws 26th Gen.
Assembly 113 (repealed 1963). The 1971 Harris Poll indicates that at least 36% of the
population would meet this test. 1971 Harris Poll 3a.
59 See 1971 Harris Poll 3c-d; Bronson 21, 24-25, 27, 30.
60 1971 Harris Poll 5-7; Jurow 588.
61 Although veniremen who demonstrate an improper opinion on certain matters
pertaining to the trial of a criminal case may be excluded for cause (see generally Vance,
Voir Dire Examination of Jurors in Federal Civil Cases, 8 Viu.. L. Rav. 76 (1962); Note,
Voir Dire Prevention of PrejudicialQuestioning, 50 MINN. L. Ray. 1088 (1966); Comment,
The Jury Voir Dire: Useless Delay or Valuable Technique, 11 S.D.L. REv. 306 (1966)), a
premise of the selection process is that only extreme cases of bias need be subject to a
challenge for cause because peremptory challenges enable the parties to remove biased
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A selection process which makes an initial selection of only those
veniremen biased toward the prosecution is skewed. The disproportionate number of veniremen holding proprosecutorial attitudes reduces
the defendant's chance of eliminating these veniremen or of counterbalancing their influence by the inclusion of others who might be more
favorable to the defense. Thus, the aforementioned studies indicate
that death-qualified juries are prosecution-prone because they are more
likely to hold attitudes which are improperly slanted against the defendant.
The results of these new studies are sufficiently authoritative to
provoke a reconsideration of the question left unresolved in Witherspoon, i.e., whether a verdict of guilty is unconstitutional when imposed
by a jury from which either those who expressed conscientious scruples
against capital punishment or those who stated they would not impose
the death penalty under any circumstances were excluded for cause.
II
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO TRIAL BY AN IMPARTIAL JURY

In Witherspoon, Mr. Justice Stewart suggested that in the absence

of a strong governmental interest, a defendant's conviction may be unconstitutional when rendered by a jury which "was less than neutral
with respect to guilt.162 Justice Stewart further intimated that com-

petent evidence establishing "that jurors not opposed to the death
penalty tend to favor the prosecution in the determination of guilt 63
would be sufficient to show that the jury was not constitutionally "neutral." This language, however, was later qualified by a warning that it
would be necessary to show "that the exclusion of jurors opposed to
capital punishment results in an unrepresentative jury on the issue of
guilt or substantially increases the risk of conviction."64 This dictum
opens up two lines of constitutional attack for the defendant who
wishes to establish a prosecution-proneness claim. He may attempt to
show either that the exclusion of jurors opposed to capital punishment
results in a constitutionally unrepresentative jury ort the issue of guilt
or that the exclusion of those jurors substantially increases the risks of
veniremen. See Note, Community Hostility and the Right to an Impartial Jury, 60
CoLUM. L. RFa. 349, 357-60 (1960).
62 391 U.S. at 520 n.18 (emphasis in original).
63 Id. at 517 (footnote omitted).
64 Id. at 518.
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conviction. Although these two claims are closely interrelated, it is appropriate to discuss them separately.
A.

The Claim that the Jury Is Unrepresentative as to Guilt
The claim that the jury is unrepresentative as to guilt may be subdivided into two further arguments. First, the defendant may assert
that either the group of people generally opposed to capital punishment
or those who would refuse to impose the death penalty under any circumstances, are a legally cognizable group which has been purposely or
systematically excluded. 5 If this claim fails, the defendant may argue
that the exclusion of either of the aforesaid groups results in an underrepresentation of some other legally cognizable group, such as blacks
or women.
1. The Legally Cognizable Group Argument
Strauder v. West Virginia 6 was the first case to find that a defendant's constitutional rights were violated when the state systematically
excluded a group of citizens from jury service. The Supreme Court
held that a black defendant's constitutional rights under the equal protection clause were violated by the application of a state statute which
excluded all blacks from jury service. In reaching this result, the Court
made it absolutely clear that the constitutional concern was to protect
the defendant on trial from the prejudice 67 which would result from
the exclusion of potential black jurors. 8 The Court reasoned that the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment was designed to
eliminate the operation of laws which would exacerbate the prejudice
that always exists against certain members of a community. The Court
concluded its analysis by noting that
[i]n view of these considerations, it is hard to see why the
statute of West Virginia should not be regarded as discriminating
against a colored man when he is put on trial for an alleged
criminal offence against the State. It is not easy to comprehend
how it can be said that while every white man is entitled to a trial
65 This claim may be made regardless of whether prospective jurors were excluded
for cause pursuant to a pre-Witherspoon or a post-Witherspoon test of exclusion.
06 100 U.S. 803 (1879).
67 Id. at 808-09.
68 The Court noted that the exclusion of blacks
is practically a brand upon them, affixed by the law, an assertion of their
inferiority, and a stimulant to that race prejudice which is an impediment to
securing individuals of the race that equal justice which the law aims to secure to
all others.
Id. at 308 (emphasis added).
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by a jury selected from persons of his own race or color, or, rather,
selected without discrimination against his color, and a negro is
not, the latter is equally protected by the law with the former. 69
The holding of Strauder is not that white people are so biased against
black defendants that they are unfit to serve as jurors, but rather that
black jurors, presumably lacking racial bias against black defendants,
will be more favorable towards these defendants than white jurors and
that therefore blacks constitute a constitutionally cognizable group
70
which may not be systematically excluded from jury service.
In Hernandez v. Texas,71 the Court applied the Strauder rule in a
situation where jurors were systematically excluded, not on the basis of
race, but because of nationality.72 In Hernandez, a Mexican-American
defendant convicted of murder claimed that he was deprived of equal
protection because the jury which convicted him was selected so as to

systematically exclude people of Mexican-American descent. The Court
noted that the Strauder rule was designed to protect defendants from

prejudice which may result from the exclusion of any well-defined
group of citizens. In demonstrating that the Strauder rule is not limited
to cases where a racial group is excluded, the Hernandez Court stated:
[C]ommunity prejudices are not static, and from time to time other
differences from the community norm may define other groups
which need the same protection. Whether such a group exists
within a community is a question of fact. When the existence of a
distinct class is demonstrated, and it is further shown that the laws,
as written or as applied, single out that class for different treatment
not based on some reasonable classification, the guarantees of the
73
Constitution have been violated.
69

Id. at

309.

It is well known that prejudices often exist against particular classes in the
community, which sway the judgment of jurors, and which, therefore, operate
in some cases to deny to persons of those classes the full enjoyment of that
protection which others enjoy.... By their manumission and citizenship the
colored race became entitled to the equal protection of the laws of the States in
which they resided; and the apprehension that through prejudice they might be
denied that equal protection, that is, that there might be discrimination against
them, was the inducement to bestow upon the national government the power to
enforce the provision that no State shall deny to them the equal protection of
the laws.
Id; cf. Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972) (white defendant has standing to bring federal
habeas corpus claim challenging systematic exclusion of blacks from grand jury that
indicted him and petit jury that convicted him).
71 347 U.S. 475 (1954). In this case, the Court's holding was premised upon the
belief that "the exclusion of a class of persons from jury service on grounds other than
race or color may also deprive a defendant who is a member of that class of the constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws." Id. at 477.
72 Id. at 478.
73 Id.
70
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In finding that Mexican-American jurors constitute a legally cognizable class, at least with respect to a Mexican-American defendant,
the Court relied on evidence relating to "the attitude of the community":
[T]he testimony of responsible officials and citizens contained the
admission that residents of the community distinguished between
"white" and "Mexican." The participation of persons of Mexican
descent in business and community groups was shown to be slight.
Until very recent times, children of Mexican descent were required
to attend a segregated school for the first four grades. At least one
restaurant in town prominently displayed a sign announcing "No
Mexicans Served." On the courthouse grounds at the time of the
hearing, there were two men's toilets, one unmarked, and the other
marked "Colored Men" and "Hombres Aqui" ("Men Here"). 74
As in Strauder, the Court made no assertion that the dominant group
in the community would be so prejudiced against a Mexican-American
defendant as to be incapable of serving as a jury. The finding of prejudice in the nonexcluded jurors appeared to be important only to the
extent that it demonstrated a difference between the attitude of that
part of the community and the group which was systematically excluded.
The principle which seems to emerge from Strauder and Hernandez is
that when there is a constitutionally cognizable difference between the
attitude of those who are eligible to serve as jurors and those who are
(1) more favorably disposed towards the defendant and (2) systematically
excluded, then the exclusion of the latter group deprives the defendant
75
of a constitutional right.

Thus, in determining whether veniremen excluded because of
their opposition to capital punishment constitute a legally cognizable
class within the Strauder-Hernandezrule, two questions are significant.
First, is there a constitutionally cognizable difference between the attitude of the veniremen who are eligible to serve and those who are systematically excluded pursuant to either a pre-Witherspoon or a
post-Witherspoon76 exclusionary test? If so, is the situation distinguish74

Id. at 479-80 (footnote omitted).

75 In Hernandez and Strauder, the Court held that the exclusion of a legally cog-

nizable group of citizens deprived the defendant of his rights under the equal protection
clause. However, later cases suggest that when a legally cognizable group is excluded, the
defendant is also deprived of his constitutional right to a trial before a jury representing
a cross-section of the community. See text accompanying notes 82-86 infra. Both cases may
be distinguished from the present situation on the ground that the rules effected in the
former cases were designed to protect defendants belonging to specific minority groups.
But see notes 80-89 and accompanying text infra.
76 Hereinafter, "post-Withcrspoon test" will denote a test which excludes veniremen
opposed to capital punishment but which is not constitutionally impermissible under the

1192

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:1176

able from Hernandez and Strauderbecause the defendants involved do
not belong to any specific minority group?
Hernandez demonstrates that the first question must be answered
on the basis of the "attitude of the community," which requires a
comparison of the attitudes of the excluded and nonexcluded group.
In the present comparison between death-qualified juries and the class
of people excluded from such juries, as in Hernandez, evidence from
several sources points toward a difference in attitudes on the part of
the two groups. For example, death-qualified jurors are more likely to
distrust defendants and to trust the prosecution; 77 they are more likely
to hold attitudes on the determination of guilt which reflect antipathy
toward constitutional protections afforded the accused;78 and when
faced with any kind of a simulated trial situation, they are significantly
more likely to render a guilty verdict.7 9 Again, as in Hernandez, the
cumulative effect of this data strengthens its impact. Thus, the results
from the studies demonstrate a constitutionally cognizable difference in
attitude between the two groups of veniremen.
With respect to the argument that Hernandez and Strauder are
distinguishable from the present analysis because of their emphasis on
national origin and race, the Supreme Court's holding in Witherspoon
and its dictum in that case and in Glasserv. United States8 o demonstrate
that a legally cognizable group may be defined solely in terms of one's
expression or exposure to particular points of view.8 ' The Witherspoon
Court maintained that in penalty determinations, the exclusion of all
veniremen who express opposition to capital punishment results in a
jury which falls "woefully short of that impartiality to which the petiCourt's holding in Witherspoon. It should be noted, however, that even after Witherspoon,
several states continued to allow the exclusion of veniremen under tests which are
clearly impermissible under the Supreme Court's holding in that case. See note 5 supra.
77 See 1971 Harris Poll 6, 8; cf. Bronson 15; Jurow 571.
78 See text accompanying note 54 supra.
79 See text accompanying notes 33-35 & 53 supra. The actual significance of the studies'
findings with respect to the increased tendency on the part of excluded veniremen to
acquit in simulated trials is more fully discussed below. See notes 126-30 and accompanying
text infra.
80 315 U.S. 60 (1942).
81 Lower court cases have suggested that the exclusion of prospective jurors with
well-defined attitudes or beliefs is enough to deny the defendant's constitutional right to
a representative jury even in the absence of any showing that the defendant was prejudiced
by the exclusion. See United States v. Butera, 420 F.2d 564, 570 (1st Cir. 1970) (dictum);
State v. Madison, 240 Md. 265, 213 A.2d 880 (1965) (Maryland's constitutional exclusion
from jury service of individuals who do not believe in Supreme Being violated fourteenth
amendment of Federal Constitution even when applied to defendant who believes in
Supreme Being). See generally Note, The Defendant's Challenge to a Racial Criterion in
Jury Selection: A Study in Standing, Due Process and Equal Protection, 74 YALE: L.J. 919
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tioner was entitled under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments."8 2
Thus, the Court defined a legally cognizable class on the basis of the
excluded venireman's expressed attitude. Moreover, Witherspoon's dictum concerning the defendant's right to a jury representing a crosssection of the community seems to apply with equal force to the
determination of guilt.8 3 In Glasser, cited with approval in Witherspoon, 4 the Court commented that if the jury was selected by a process
which allowed on the jury only members of the Illinois League of
Women Voters, who had attended "'jury classes whose lecturers presented the views of the prosecution,' "85 then the defendant's constitutional rights to trial by an impartial jury would have been violated.,
It follows that a group's tendency to express or demonstrate attitudes
relating directly to a juror's function is a perfectly appropriate index
for determining whether the group is legally cognizable within the
definitions of Strauder and Hernandez.8 7 Therefore, the finding that
the exclusion of veniremen based upon their views on capital punishment pursuant to either a pre-Witherspoon or a post-Witherspoon test
results in the selection of jurors who are substantially more likely to be
biased in favor of the prosecution is sufficient to establish that the
application of either test results in the exclusion of a legally cognizable
89

group.

2. The UnderrepresentationArgument
The results of the previously mentioned studies demonstrate that
the exclusion of veniremen opposed to capital punishment results in
82 391 U.S. at 518 (citations omitted).

83 See note 63 and accompanying text supra.
84 391 U.S. at 518.
85 Glasser v.. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 84 (1942).
86 Id. at 87. Although Glasser was a federal case, the Court discussed principles which

are mandated by the sixth amendment guarantee of trial by an impartial jury, rather
than the Court's supervisory control over federal trials. See, e.g., id. at 84-85.
87 In view of this analysis, the defendant's nonmembership in the excluded class
should not be relevant. The holdings in Hernandez and Strauder were limited to defendants belonging to the excluded class because a constitutionally cognizable difference in
attitude between the eligible and excluded veniremen could be found only with respect
to defendants belonging to that class. In general, however, there appears to be a trend
toward completely abandoning the requirement that a defendant must be a member of
the excluded class. See, e.g., Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 504 (1972) (white defendant has
standing to challenge systematic exclusion of black veniremen); State v. Madison, 240 Md.
265, 268, 213 A.2d 880, 882 (1965) (any defendant has standing to challenge systematic
exclusion of nonbelievers). But see Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 287 (1947) (dictum)
(refusal to rule on issue of defendant's identity with excluded group). See generally Note,
supra note 81.
88 See text accompanying notes 36-37, 46-47 & 53 supra.
89 See text accompanying notes 33-35 & 53 supra.
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a clear underrepresentation of the following groups: blacks, women,
those with less than a high school education, and people with certain
religious beliefs, especially Jews and agnostics.90 Since all of these
groups have already been judicially recognized as legally cognizable in
certain circumstances, 91 an independent attack on the practice of seeking a death-qualified jury may be premised on the claim that the resulting underrepresentation of any one (or all) of these legally cognizable
92
groups is unconstitutional.
The claim that the exclusion of veniremen opposed to capital punishment results in an underrepresentation of black jurors is particularly compelling. The studies universally demonstrate that the operation of either a pre-Witherspoon or a post-Witherspoon exclusionary
test results in a substantially disproportionate elimination of black
citizens. Thus, under Bronson's figures, application of a pre-Witherspoon exclusionary test results in the exclusion of 80 percent of all
blacks, but only about 40 percent of all whites.93 The results of the
Harris Poll indicate that application of a pre-Witherspoon test results
in the exclusion of 52 percent of all blacks and 33 percent of all whites,
and operation of the post-Witherspoon test leads to the exclusion of 35
percent of all blacks and only 21 percent of all whites.9 4 If a state were
to adopt a system under which this percentage of black and white citizens was automatically excluded, such a system would be clearly unconstitutional. Strauder's prohibition of the systematic exclusion of
black veniremen 95 is equally applicable whether all or only a proportion of black citizens are systematically excluded because blacks would
be "singled out and expressly denied by a statute all right to participate
. . .as jurors." 96
90 See Bronson 15-50; 1971 Harris Poll Sc.
91 See Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972) (blacks); Ballard v. United States, 829 U.S.
187 (1946) (women); Labat v. Bennet, 365 F.2d 698 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S.
991 (1967) (daily wage earners and blacks); State v. Madison, 240 Md. 265, 213 A.2d 880
(1965) (nonbelievers).
92 For a discussion of which defendants have standing to raise claims of this type, see
note 87 supra.
93 See note 48 and accompanying text supra.
94 1971 Harris Poll 3a, 3d. Of course, the studies' demonstration that the exclusion
of veniremen opposed to capital punishment results in the underrepresentation of certain
groups generally does not prove that such underrepresentation necessarily occurred in
any particular area at any particular time. However, since presenting precise evidence
relating to these matters is more apt to be within the control of the prosecution, the
studies should suffice at least to shift to the prosecution the burden of showing that in his
particular location the exclusion of those opposed to capital punishment did not result
in a substantial underrepresentation of one or more of the relevant groups.
95 100 U.S. at 308-09.
96 Id. at 308; cf. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 839 (1960) (fixing of city boundaries
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The prosecution will undoubtedly argue that blacks are not "systematically excluded" by a jury selection process which eliminates
those persons opposed to capital punishment. Such an argument would
construe Strauder as not prohibiting the exclusion of large numbers of
black citizens from jury service if such an exclusion was merely the
incidental result of a state policy on the question of capital punishment.
This argument fails to recognize that a black citizen's stand on the
question of capital puninshment is intimately associated with his blackness. Blacks are disproportionately opposed to capital punishment because over the years a disproportionate number of blacks have been
executed. Therefore, because of the relationship between a black
venireman's beliefs and his blackness, the exclusion from juries of large
numbers of blacks who oppose capital punishment becomes a systematic
racial exclusion.98
This does not mean that any black excluded from a jury is being
excluded on racial grounds. A distinction should be made between a
selection process which leads to an initial underrepresentation of black
veniremen, and one which allows the direct exclusion of a disproportionate number of apparently qualified potential black jurors. 09
Within limits, it is plausible to accept the former situation as an
unavoidable by-product of the state's choice of a selection process. 00
In the latter case, however, the apparent lack of necessity for excluding
qualified veniremen makes it appropriate to find that the resulting
to exclude blacks from voting in municipal elections violative of fourteenth amendment
due process and equal protection clauses and fifteenth amendment).
97 See, e.g., Bedau, Capital Punishment in Oregon, 1903-64, 45 ORE. L. REv. 1, 10-12
(1965); Williams, The Death Penalty and the Negro, 67 THE Caisis 501 (1960).
08 See A. KoEsrm,
REFLECTIONS ON HANGING 167 (1956), cited in Witherspoon v.
Illinois, 891 U.S. 510, 520 n.17 (1967).
99 See, e.g., Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 467-74 (1953) (jury selection system from
tax lists, resulting in underrepresentation of blacks because of their lower economic
status, held valid); United States v. Ditommaso, 405 F.2d 385, 391-92 (4th Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 934 (1969) (selection system resulting in underrepresentation of women,
young persons, and those less educated held valid when unintentional and unsystematic);
Christian v. Maine, 404 F.2d 205, 206 (Ist Cir. 1968) (no constitutional requirement for
statistically proportionate representation of various groups as long as no showing that
jury "was drawn from an artificially limited base, or in a discriminatory manner').
100 The limits of the Court's constitutional tolerance for such a system is sketched in
Sims v. Georgia, 389 U.S. 404 (1967). In Sims, jury lists were drawn from county tax digests
which separately listed taxpayers by race. Blacks comprised 24.4% of the individual
taxpayers, but constituted only 9.8% of the traverse jury list. The Court held that this
method of selection did not comply with constitutional requirements. Id. at 407-08. If
Bronson's figures are accepted (Bronson 18-20) in a case where all veniremen opposed to
capital punishment are excluded for cause, the resulting underrepresentation of blacks
will be of a magnitude equal to the discrepancy condemned in Sims.
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significant underrepresentation of blacks constitutes a systematic exclusion unless the state can justify its exclusionary policy.
In Labat v. Bennet,'0 the Fifth Circuit apparently utilized this
approach in holding that the exclusion of daily wage earners from jury
service constitutes racial discrimination because the excluded class contains a disproportionately large number of blacks.10 2 The court did not
say that the exclusion of laborers was designed to exclude blacks, but
rather applied a three-fold test which emphasized the justification for
the exclusionary rule, the number of blacks excluded, and the state's
efforts to remedy the resulting underrepresentation. The court did not
discredit the state's assertion that the exclusionary rule was benignly
designed to exclude those who would lose their daily wages if called to
jury service. But the court weighed this assertion and found that "[a]
benign and theoretically neutral principle loses its aura of sanctity
when it fails to function neutrally." 10 3 Finding that the system failed
to function neutrally, the court noted that the exclusionary practice
excluded a disproportionate number of blacks (forty-seven percent of
the entire black working force) and emphasized that the state had made
no effort to correct the resulting racial imbalance. 1°4 On the basis of
these findings, the court concluded that the selection process was legally
invalid as a systematic exclusion of blacks."0 5
The Labat test yields a similar result when applied to the exclusion of veniremen opposed to capital punishment. Although the exclusionary tests on their face do not discriminate against blacks, their
operation will lead to a constitutionally impermissible exclusion if it
can be demonstrated that a substantial disproportion of blacks are
excluded and that no corrective measures are taken to rectify the resulting underinclusion. The studies demonstrate that the exclusion of
veniremen opposed to capital punishment constitutes an exclusion of
large numbers of blacks on a level comparable to that condemned in
Labat. Of course, the state should have the opportunity to show either
that in a particular location, application of the exclusionary test did not
result in a substantially disproportionate exclusion of blacks, 10 6 or that
101 365 F.2d 698 (5th Cir. 1966).
102 Id. at 720. The court noted that the systematic exclusion of wage earners was in

itself an unconstitutional exclusion of a legally cognizable class. Id. at 719-20.
103 Id. at 724.
104 Id. at 725.
105 The Court stated that the facts "give rise to an inference of 'purposeful discrimi-

nation' on the part of the jury selection officials, within the legal sense of those words."
Id. at 726.
106 See note 94 supra.
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corrective measures were taken to correct any racial imbalance. When
the state fails to meet this burden, however, a jury selection system
which excuses black veniremen because of their opposition to capital
punishment should be held unconstitutional as a systematic underrepresentation of black jurors in violation of the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment. 07
When the defendant is a woman, a Jew, an agnostic, or relatively
uneducated, the claim that the exclusionary rule results in an underrepresentation of blacks0 8 may be buttressed by the argument that in
obtaining a death-qualified jury the state has also created an underrepresentation of an additional legally cognizable group, usually the
group of which the defendant is a member. 00 The cumulative impact
of these arguments serves to strengthen and reinforce the claim that the
systematic exclusion of those opposed to capital punishment results in
a constitutionally impermissible tendency toward the selection of an
unrepresentative jury." 0
B.

The Claim that the Defendant's Risks of Conviction Are Substantially Increased

The question arises as to whether the results from the post-Witherspoon studies demonstrate that the jury selection process utilized in
capital offense cases results in a sufficiently substantial increase in the
risk of conviction to establish a constitutional claim. Jurow's study
shows that in a mock trial the number of venireman voting for conviction rises by as much as five percent"' if a pre-Witherspoon exclu107 Cf. Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400, 404 (1942) (citations omitted): "[The jury commissioners] failed to perform their constitutional duty.., not to pursue a course of conduct
in the administration of their office which would operate to discriminate in the selection

of jurors on racial grounds."
108 In view of the Court's ruling in Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972), any defendant

may establish a constitutional claim by showing a significant underrepresentation of black
citizens on his jury. On the other hand, when the exclusion of other legally cognizable
groups such as women (see Ballard v. U.S., 329 U.S. 187 (1946)), is at issue it is possible
that the defendant will have to show that he or she is a member of the class which is
allegedly underrepresented. But see note 87 supra.
109 See 1971 Harris Poll Sa. The extent of the underrepresentation of these other
groups in a death-qualified system can be determined by using the Harris and Bronson
figures on a random sample of 100 jurors. For example, the percentage of women in the
venire would be reduced from 50% to approximately 42% under a pre-Witherspoon
exclusion according to Harris's and Bronson's figures. See Bronson 22; 1971 Harris Poll 3a.
Using a post-Witherspoon test would result in a reduction of women from 50% to 47%. See
1971 Harris Poll 3a.
110 Cf. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 85-86 (1942).
111 The conviction rate rose from 43.6% to 48.6% with respect to the liquor store
holdup. With respect to the rape-murder, exclusion of those people opposed to capital
punishment causes the conviction rate to rise from 58.3% to 60.0%. Jurow 583.
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sionary text is applied, 112 and by more than one percent"13 if a postWitherspoon exclusionary test is applied. 1 4 Since the Court in Witherspoon implied that it would consider results from carefully documented
scientific studies, 115 Jurow's figures should be accepted as a relatively
conservative"1 6 indication of the extent to which either exclusionary
test would increase the percentage of chosen veniremen who would vote
for conviction.
The constitutional effect of a one percent increase in the number
of eligible veniremen who would vote to convict will not be to increase
every defendant's chances of conviction by a slight amount, but rather
will be to magnify the danger of conviction for a few defendants very
significantly, while leaving the great majority of defendants unaffected.
Thus, if one out of one hundred prospective jurors is prosecution-prone
because of the operation of the exclusionary test, a jury of twelve containing that one juror would be selected approximately thirteen percent
of the time, 117 and a jury of six containing that juror would be selected
slightly in excess of six percent of the time.'"' On those occasions in
which an additional prosecution-prone juror would be placed on a jury
of either six or twelve, the defendant's chances of acquittal would be
significantly diminished because the change of a single juror's vote on
the first ballot may have an enormous impact on the question of
whether a defendant will be convicted or acquitted. 119
112 A pre-Witherspoon exclusionary test would presumably exclude those subjects
who stated that they were either opposed to capital punishment under any circumstances
or opposed to it in all but a few cases. See generally Comment, supra note 5.
113 With respect to the rape-murder, the removal of those people who would be
excluded under a post-Witherspoon test caused the conviction rate to increase from 58.3%
to 60.0%. Jurow 583.
114 A post-Witherspoon test would presumably exclude those subjects who stated
that if they were selected they "could not vote for the death penalty regardless of the
facts and circumstances of the case." Witherspoon v. illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 520 (1967).
115 See notes 10-13 and accompanying text supra.
116 The sample selected by Jurow is likely to understate the proportion of people who
are opposed to capital punishment. See notes 39-41 and accompanying text supra.
117 This figure is obtained by adding the sum of the chances of choosing the
prosecution-prone juror in each of 12 random selections, keeping in mind that the
population decreases by one with each selection. Thus the sum of 1/100, 1/99 . . . 1/90,
1/89 equals 12.7%.
118 By the same process, the sum of 1/100 . . .1/95 equals 6.15%.
119 When a juror's vote is changed so that instead of one vote for acquittal, there is
a unanimous vote for conviction, the significance of the addition of a single prosecutionprone juror is obvious. See Marion v. Beto, 434 F.2d 29, 32 (5th Cir. 1970) (footnote
omitted):
Where, as here, unanimity of decision is required to impose the death sentence,
the stark reality is that one improperly excluded juror may mean the difference
between life or death for a defendant. Although a defendant certainly has no
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Although Mr. Justice Stewart gave no definitive exposition of
what constitutes a substantial increase in the risk of conviction, the
Witherspoon Court's reliance on Glasser v. United States120 suggests
that a showing of any perceptible bias in favor of the prosecution will
suffice to prove a constitutional violation. Moreover, Witherspoon itself
implies that a method of jury selection that substantially increases the
risks of conviction as to some defendants is sufficient to establish a constitutional claim.
In addition to disapproving a process of selecting jurors from a
group which had been exposed to proprosecution views,121 Glasser
emphasized that
[t]endencies, no matter how slight, toward the selection of jurors
by any method other than a process which will insure a trial by a
representative group are undermining processes weakening the in122
stitution of jury trial, and should be sturdily resisted.
Implicit in this principle, which was approved in Witherspoon,123 is a
recognition that the defendant's right to trial before an impartial jury
selected from a cross-section of the community involves something
more than a mere ban on the systematic exclusion of legally cognizable
groups. To have a jury which is "truly representative of the community,".2 4 the defendant must be given the luck of the draw; he must
have the same opportunity as the prosecution to select members of the
assurance that a properly-empaneled jury will not impose the death penalty, it

seems to us that in light of the vast difference in treatment which may result from
the improper exclusion of a single venireman, even that degree of error is
prejudicial to the rights of a defendant in a capital case.
Moreover, when the jurors are split on the first ballot, a switch of a single vote on that
ballot may be of crucial significance. One study found that in more than 90% of the
cases, when there is a disagreement among members of the jury on the first ballot,
judgment will be rendered in favor of the side of the largest vote on the initial ballot.
See H. ZEisEL, supra note 17, at 24-32.
The importance of each individual juror's vote is obviously heightened by the recent
Supreme Court decisions holding that state jury verdicts need not be unanimous (see
Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972)), and
may be rendered by a jury composed of as few as six members. See Williams v. Florida,
399 U.S. 78 (1970). These decisions make it possible for jury verdicts to be rendered by a
vote of 9-3 (see Johnson v. Louisiana, supra) or perhaps even by a vote of 4-2. But see id. at
366 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Thus, when the presence of an additional prosecutionprone juror leads to the difference between a 6-6 or a 3-3 tie and a 7-5 or a 4-2 vote for
conviction, the effect of the Witherspoon exclusionary test on that particular defendant is
likely to be crucial.
120 315 U.S. 60, 80-84 (1942).
121 See notes 85-86 and accompanying text supra.
122 315 U.S. at 86.
123 391 U.S. at 518.
124 Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940) (dictum).
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community who will view his case in a relatively favorable light.12 5
Although each defendant must take his chances with respect to the
way in which the "luck of the draw" operates in his case, a jury selection
process which is skewed so that no defendant will have an equal "luck
of the draw" is unconstitutional.
Given this principle, the studies indicate that the exclusion of
veniremen pursuant to either a pre-Witherspoon or a post-Witherspoon
exclusionary test results in the selection of jurors who, when compared
to jurors representing an accurate cross-section of the community, are
not only statistically more prone to convict when participating in simulated trials, 26 but are also significantly more likely to express views
which evidence a constitutionally impermissible bias127 in favor of the
prosecution.
Moreover, Witherspoon held that
a sentence of death cannot be carried out if the jury that imposed
or recommended it was chosen by excluding veniremen for cause
simply because they voiced general objections to the death penalty
or expressed
conscientious or religious scruples against its infic8
tion.12
As the Fifth Circuit recognized in Marion v. Beto,129 the implication
of this holding is that the improper exclusion of even a single veniremen will be grounds for invalidating the imposition of a sentence of
death:
Given the weightiness of the subject involved it really does not
follow that the improper exclusion of a relatively small number of
the total veniremen examined does not prejudice the defendant's
rights to an impartial cross-section of the community. 30
If the defendant's constitutional right to a fair penalty determination is prejudiced by the exclusion of even a single veniremen who will
state that he is generally opposed to capital punishment, it must follow
that as to the determination of guilt, the replacement of even a single
venireman who will vote for an acquittal in a doubtful case with one
who will vote to convict constitutes a sufficient increase in the defen125 The basis for this rule is undoubtedly a concern for preserving the legitimacy of

jury verdicts. Jury verdicts rendered by jurors selected by excluding that segment of the
community which is likely to favor the defendant cannot represent the judgment of the
community.
126 See notes 33-35 and accompanying text supra.
127 See notes 33-35 and accompanying text supra.
128 391 U.S. at 522 (footnote omitted).
129 434 F.2d 29 (5th Cir. 1971).
180 Id. at 32.
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dant's risk of conviction to establish the constitutional claim. Thus,
Jurow's study demonstrates that the exclusion of veniremen pursuant
to either a pre-Witherspoon or a post-Witherspoon exclusionary test
results in a constitutionally impermissible increase in the defendant's
risks of conviction.
III
THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAIM
Since defendants in capital cases only are subject to the prejudice
which accrues as a result of the exclusion for cause of veniremen opposed to capital punishment, invocation of the equal protection clause
will add a new dimension to the arguments previously developed. A
defendant convicted by a death-qualified jury may argue that his rights
under the equal protection clause are violated, because whereas defendants in non-capital cases are subject to one process of jury selection,
the state, without any justifiable basis, has subjected the class of defendants to which he belongs to a different and prejudicial process of
131
jury selection.
In Fay v. New York 132 the Supreme Court gave extensive consideration to a claim of this nature. At issue in Fay was the constitutionality
of a New York procedure subjecting certain defendants to trial before
a so-called "blue-ribbon" jury. Although most defendants were tried
before jurors selected from a general panel, upon application of either
adversary, New York trial judges had discretion to require that any particular civil or criminal case be tried before a special jury, 18 3 consisting
131 This equal protection analysis is analogous to that which would be applied in
determining whether a fundamental constitutional right should be protected under the
due process clause. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965); Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 659 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting). The protection afforded fundamental rights under the equal protection clause, however, is clearly broader than that afforded such rights under the due process clause. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658
n.10 (1972). For example, although the due process clause does not require a state to provide a criminal defendant a right of appeal, the equal protection clause does require that
when the state provides an appeal for some, it cannot deny it to others because of their inability to pay, even if such a denial may be rationally defended on other grounds. See
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 553, 353-58 (1963). See generally Dunham v. Pulsifer, 312 F.
Supp. 411, 417 (D. Vt. 1970) (dictum); Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82
HARv. L. REv. 1065, 1180 (1969).
182 332 U.S. 261 (1947).
183 Id. at 268-69. Pursuant to the relevant statute (Law of April 7, 1938, ch. 552,
§ 749-aa(4), [1938] N.Y. Laws 18-b (repealed 1965)), the trial court's discretion was to be
exercised only upon a showing that

by reason of the importance or intricacy of the case, a special jury is required,
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of people selected from the general panel with the exclusion of four
categories of veniremen. 134 Two defendants subjected to trial by jurors
selected from this special panel claimed that they were denied equal
protection because statistics showed that jurors selected from the special
panel were more likely to convict than jurors selected from the general
panel. To support this claim, the defendants relied on studies compiled
by the New York State Judicial Council which showed that in certain
types of homicide cases, it appeared that "in 1933 and 1934, special
juries convicted in eighty-three percent and eighty-two percent of the
cases while ordinary juries those years convicted in forty-three percent
and thirty-seven percent respectively."' 3 5 The Court rejected the evidence gleaned from these figures because it had never been suggested
that any of the special jury convictions were unwarranted 8 6 and on
grounds of staleness:
These defendants were convicted March 15, 1945, when the
statistics offered here as to relative propensity of the two juries to
convict were more than ten years old, and when the conditions
which may have produced the discrepancy in ratio of convictions
had long since been corrected. 137
However, the Court intimated that, absent the problem of staleness,
the evidence from the studies might have been sufficient to establish a
violation of the equal protection clause:
or . . . the issue to be tried has been so widely commented upon . . . that an
ordinary jury cannot without delay and difficulty be obtained ... or that for any
other reason the due, efficient and impartial administration of justice in the particular case would be advanced by the trial of such an issue by a special jury.
332 U.S. at 268-69 (footnote omitted).
134 332 U.S. at 267-68. The categories of excluded veniremen were as follows:
No person shall be selected as such special juror who is by law disqualified or exempt from service as a trial juror, or who has been convicted of a criminal offense,
or found guilty of fraud or other misconduct by the judgment of any civil court
or who possesses such conscientious opinions with regard to the death penalty as
would preclude his finding a defendant guilty if the crime charged be punishable
with death, or who doubts his ability to lay aside an opinion or impression
formed from newspaper reading or otherwise, or to render an impartial verdict
upon the evidence, uninfluenced by any such opinion or impression, or whose
opinion as to circumstantial evidence is such as would prevent his finding a verdict of guilty upon such evidence, or who avows such a prejudice against any law
of the state as would preclude his finding a defendant guilty of a violation of
such law, or who avows such a prejudice against any particular defense to a criminal charge as would prevent his giving a fair and impartial trial upon the merits
of such defense, or who avows that he cannot in all cases give to a defendant who
fails to testify as a witness in his own behalf the full benefit of the statutory provision that such defendant's neglect or refusal to testify as a witness in his own
behalf shall not create any presumption against him.
Law of April 7, 1938, ch. 552, § 749-aa(2), [1938] N.Y. Laws 18-b (repealed 1965).
135 332 U.S. at 279.
136 Id. at 280.
137 Id. at 281.
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If it were proved [sic] that in 1945 an inequality between the
special jury's record of convictions and that of the ordinary jury
continued as it was found by the Judicial Council to have prevailed
in 1933-34, some foundation would be laid for a claim of unequal
treatment. No defendant has a right to escape an existing mechanism of trial merely on the ground that some other could be devised which would give him a better chance of acquittal. But in
this case an alternative system actually was provided by the state to
[A] discretion, even if vested in the court,
other defendants ....
to shunt a defendant before a jury so chosen as greatly to lessen his
chances while others accused of a like offense are tried by a jury
favorable to them, would hardly be "equal
so drawn as to be more u38
protection of the laws."

The Court emphasized the need to adhere to a system which would not
"legsen [a defendant's] chances" of conviction. This statement implies
a recognition by the Fay majority that whenever the defendant presents
statistical evidence that a dual system of jury selection leads to an increased probability of conviction for the class of people to which the
defendant belongs, the defendant's conviction will constitute a violation
of equal protection unless the state can show either that the dual system
of jury selection does not in fact lead to an increased probability of
conviction for one class of defendants, 18 9 or that the disparity in conviction rates is justified by a substantial state interest. 140
In several recent cases the Supreme Court has reiterated the principle that when a state's classifications threaten fundamental personal
rights, the equal protection clause requires a compelling state interest,
and the lines denoting such classifications are subject to the most rigid
scrutiny. 141 Since the right to a fair trial constitutes a fundamental personal right,142 a showing that a state's dual system of jury selection
138 Id. at 285 (emphasis added).
189 A number of explanations, other than the different processes of jury selection,

might explain the difference in conviction rates. For example, the variation might be attributed to the differences in the cases selected for examination or to the fact that the

prosecutor prepared more extensively for special jury trials. Id. at 286.
140 Although the Court in Fay noted a state interest in providing administrative pro-

cedures which could expedite the selection of jurors in certain trials (id. at 271), the Court's
analysis suggested that this interest would not be sufficient to justify a classification which
substantially increased the chances of conviction for one group of defendants. Id.; see text
accompanying note 138 supra.
141 See, e.g., Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972) (right of unacknowledged illegitimate children to collect workmen's compensation death benefits); Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (right of unwed fathers to custody of illegitimate children upon
mother's death); Cipriano v. City of Houma, 895 U.S. 701 (1969) (right of nonproperty taxpayer to vote); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (right to travel); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (right to free transcript for purpose of appeal); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 816 U.S. 585 (1942) (right to procreate).
142 See Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 518 (1967).
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constitutes a classification which threatens this right should be sufficient
to invoke the compelling interest test.
Several recent cases seem to indicate that the dual system does
48 the
establish an impermissible classification. In Jackson v. Indiana,1
Court held that the use of different commitment and release procedures
for those charged with a criminal offense than were used for those who
were civilly committed as mentally incompetent constituted a denial
of equal protection. 144 The Court emphatically asserted that with respect to those individuals charged with a criminal offense the diminution of procedural safeguards constituted an unconstitutional classification:
[W]e hold that by subjecting [the defendant] to a more lenient commitment standard and to a more stringent standard of release than
those generally applicable to all others not charged with offenses,
...Indiana deprived [him] of equal protection of the laws under
the Fourteenth Amendment. 145
Jackson's suggestion that a violation of the equal protection clause will
occur whenever the presence of a dual system potentially prejudices
one group of defendants is confirmed by holdings in other recent cases.
In Douglas v. California,"" the Court struck down a California procedure for the appointment of counsel which distinguished between
indigent defendants and those who could afford counsel on appeal. 47
The Douglas Court made no finding that indigent defendants were in
fact prejudiced by the procedure. Rather, the Court merely found that
the potential for prejudice created an invidious classification which
"[did] not comport with fair procedure."' 4s
In the present discussion of convictions rendered by death-quali143 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
144 Id. at 723-30.
145 Id. at 730.
146 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
147 The California procedure provided that the state would appoint counsel for the
indigent defendant upon request only if the California District Court of Appeal's preliminary examination of the record showed that the appointment of counsel would be advantageous to the defendant or helpful to the court. id. at 355.
148 Id. at 357. The prejudice resulted from a requirement that one class of defendants
make a preliminary showing of merit before counsel would be appointed. Cf. Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658 n.10 (1972) (predicating "finding of constitutional invalidity
under the Equal Protection Clause ...on the observation that a State has accorded bedrock procedural rights to some, but not to all similarly situated'); Bower v. Vaughn, 313
F. Supp. 37, 42 (D. Ariz.), aff'd mem., 400 U.S. 884 (1970) (applying Stanley rationale
to invalidate state hospital superintendent's discretionary authority to return patients to
their state of former residence even though such authority "exercised benevolently in the
best interests of the patient').
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fled juries, the state's dual system of jury selection infringes on one
group of citizens' constitutional right to jury trial by denying the citizens
within that group the right to include as members of the jury those
people opposed to capital punishment.149 Under the Court's equal protection cases, it would appear that, absent a compelling state interest,
the exclusion of this group of prospective jurors as to one class of defendants will operate as an invidious classification. This is especially
true in light of studies which demonstrate that the exclusion of jurors
pursuant to either a pre-Witherspoon or a post-Witherspoon test creates
a statistically significant potential for prejudice 50
The interest of the state in seeking the death penalty is the only
possible justification for the exclusion of veniremen opposed to capital
punishment. Furman clearly indicates, however, that this interest is
illusory.' 5 ' Therefore, there is no compelling state interest which can
justify the invidious classification which occurs as a result of a state's
dual system of jury selection. Accordingly, the conviction of a defendant
by a jury which excluded any group of veniremen for cause because of
their opposition to capital punishment is invalid under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
IV
RETROACTIVITY: REVERSING CONVICTIONS BY DEATH-QUALIFIED JURIES

The remaining question concerns the extent to which a constitutional ruling invalidating a conviction by a death-qualified jury can be
retroactively applied. Since Furman appears to prohibit the imposition
of a death sentence under any statute currently in effect, a merely prospective ruling invalidating convictions obtained pursuant to a system
of jury selection previously employed in capital cases might be expected
to have a relatively minor impact. 5 2 On the other hand, a retroactive
149

See notes 87 & 54 and accompanying text supra.

150 See text accompanying notes 33-35 & 53 supra.

151 Since Furman held that death sentences obtained pursuant to discretionary capital
offense statutes were unconstitutional, a state's interest in obtaining such sentences is
illusory.
152 Despite the ruling in Furman, prosecutors in several cases have sought and obtained the death penalty under statutes imposing discretionary power in the jury. Thus,
even a prospective ruling on the prosecution-proneness issue might play a critical part in
future cases by deterring prosecutors from attempts of this kind, affecting the type of jury
selection process employed in these cases, or invalidating convictions obtained. Similarly,
if death sentences were sought to be obtained pursuant to statutes imposing mandatory
capital punishment, a ruling on the prosecution-proneness issue would have important
consequences. However, in this situation the issue arises in a different context because the
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holding would have an enormous impact, invalidating not only the
convictions of most of the 631 defendants who were previously under
sentence of death but also a much larger number of convictions in
which the prosecution unsuccessfully sought the death penalty. 3 While
analysis of the problem of retroactive application depends to some extent on the constitutional doctrine utilized to invalidate convictions
rendered by a death-qualified jury, ultimately the problem can only be
resolved by weighing both the interests of the defendants convicted by
death-qualified juries and the interests of the state in law enforcement.
A.

The Question of Whether Invalidating Convictions Imposed by a
Death-Qualified Jury Constitutes a "New Decision"

Unless a decision invalidating convictions rendered by a deathqualified jury is based upon new constitutional doctrine, the decision
must be applied retroactively. While in the past decade the Court has
not hesitated to hold that newly announced constitutional decisions
may be applied prospectively,' 5 4 no case has ever suggested that a new
application of an established constitutional principle should not be
given retroactive effect. The doctrine of stare decisis requires that the
law develop incrementally by adhering to and expanding upon precedent.5 5 If a decision were conceived as establishing a new rule of law
whenever an established constitutional principle is applied to a new
factual situation, each decision would have precedential value only
with respect to cases containing identical facts.
Although the Supreme Court has never explicitly discussed the
issue of retroactivity of a new application of established constitutional
state could argue that its interest in obtaining a fair trial should give it the right to exclude jurors whose opposition to capital punishment renders them incapable of returning
a guilty verdict with a mandatory death sentence. See note 16 supra.
153 Although it is impossible to accurately estimate the number of defendants now
in prison who have been convicted by death-qualified juries, the number is undoubtedly
in the thousands. For example, in 1970, the nationwide estimate of the number of murder
and nonnegligent manslaughter convictions was 16,000 and the estimate of nationwide
forcible rape convictions was 38,000. BuREAu OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEr'T OF COMMERCE,
STAT rscAL. ABsTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1972, at 140 (1972). Even allowing for the fact
that the majority of these convictions were probably entered pursuant to a guilty plea,
the number of such convictions rendered by death-qualified juries is still substantial.
154 See, e.g., Willams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646 (1971) (prospective application of
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), which narrowed permissible scope of searches
incident to arrest); Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966) (prospective application of
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964),
which established new protections for defendants involved in pretrial interrogation); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965) (prospective application of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643 (1961), which held exclusionary rule applicable to state criminal prosecutions).
155 See generally J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAw 61 (2d ed. 1960).
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doctrine, 15 6 its decisions pertaining to coerced confessions confirm the
principle that whenever the application of an established constitutional
doctrine to a particular fact situation produces a new result, either
because new data has been brought to the Court's attention or the
Court is willing to revise its assumptions about human behavior, the
result will not be treated as a new constitutional decision 57 Thus,
even though it has been established since at least 1936 that the introduction of a coerced confession in a state criminal case constitutes a
violation of the fourteenth amendment's due process clause,158 modem
assumptions concerning the effect of psychological pressure on a defendant have greatly expanded the constitutional definition of coercion.
For example, although a voluntary confession has long been defined as
one which is a product of a defendant's free and rational choice, 159 increasingly sophisticated notions pertaining to the operation of the
human mind have broadened the concept of free and rational choice.
The definition of an uncoerced confession has evolved from one where
the choice was not the "result of torture, physical or psychological"' 160 to
one which involves a decision made without the interference of significant police pressure. 161 As a result, both the quantity and quality of
police questioning which will establish an impermissible influence on
the defendant's will have been significantly reduced. 162 However, despite these significant reinterpretations of the definition of coercion,
the Court has implied that the current definition of a constitutionally
163
coerced confession must be given retroactive effect.
Since generally only decisions announcing a new constitutional
rule may be denied retroactive effect, analysis in the present case must
focus on whether a decision invalidating convictions rendered by a
death-qualified jury would be a "new decision" in the constitutional
sense. Since the analysis of this issue will vary depending on the consti156 But see Muniz v. Beto, 434 F.2d 697, 705 (5th Cir. 1970).
157 See, e.g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963); Blackburn v. Alabama, 361
U.S. ig99 (1960).
158 See Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936); cf. Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S.
613 (1896) (excluding use of coerced confession in federal courts).
159 See, e.g., Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 207 (1960) ("rational choice'). See
generally Developments in the Law-Confessions, 79 HARv. L. REv. 935, 973-74 (1966).

160 United States v.Mitchell, 322 U.S. 65, 68 (1944) (dictum).
161 See, e.g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963). See generally Developments
in the Law, supra note 159, at 973-74.
162 Compare Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963), with Stein v. New York, 846
U.S. 156 (1953). See generally Schwartz, Retroactivity, Reliability, and Due Process: A
Reply to Professor Mishkin, 33 U. Cu. L. REv. 719, 725-27 (1966); Developments in the
Law, supra note 159, at 973-74.
163 See, e.g., Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737 (1966).
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tutional ground utilized, each of the three constitutional theories discussed earlier in this article will be separately examined.
1. The Claim that the Jury Is Unrepresentativeas to Guilt
If the Court accepts the argument that the jury is unrepresentative as to guilt because of the systematic exclusion of a legally cognizable group of citizens (i.e., those who are opposed to capital punishment), no new constitutional principle will be established, because it
has been settled since 1879 that the exclusion of a legally cognizable
group of citizens constitutes a denial of equal protection.' 4 As the
Court stated in Hernandez v. Texas, 165 the determination of whether a
legally cognizable group "exists within a community is a question of
fact"'166 to be decided on the basis of whatever evidence may be adduced
concerning the extent to which the class of jurors excluded may have
a more favorable attitude toward the defendant than those eligible to
serve. 117 In Muniz v. Beto,168 the Fifth Circuit held that Hernandez
must be afforded retroactive application, rejecting the state's argument
to the contrary: 169
[W]ith regard to this contention we take note of the fact that the
Supreme Court, in a series of recent decisions beginning with Linkletter v. Walker ... has made it clear that new constitutional interpretations related to criminal procedure may sometimes be denied
retroactive application....
The problem with the State's argument is that the present
case does not involve any new constitutional interpretation ...
[W]e merely apply a well-settled doctrine of long standing. 70
A holding that the elimination of veniremen opposed to capital punishment constitutes the exclusion of a legally cognizable class would be an
application of the same "well-settled doctrine." Therefore, a strong
argument emerges in favor of affording such a holding retroactive ap71
plication. '
164 See Strauder

v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879).

165 347 U.S. 475 (1954).
166 Id. at 478.
167 See notes 72-75 and accompanying text supra.

168 434 F.2d 697 (5th Cir. 1970).
The state also argued that the facts of Muniz did not fall within the holding of
Hernandez because the exclusion of Mexican-American citizens was not purposeful. Id.
at 705.
169

170 Id.
171 On

the other hand, the state may argue that the significant step from Strauder
and Hernandez, in which the excluded veniremen belonged to specific minority groups, to
the present situation, in which the veniremen have a disproportionate tendency to adhere
to well-defined attitudes, is bridged only by Glasser's and Witherspoon's recognition that
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2. The Claim that the Defendant's Risks of Conviction Are Substantially Increased
A holding invalidating convictions on the ground that a deathqualified jury "substantially increases the risk of conviction"'17 2 should
be treated as a new constitutional decision. Before Witherspoon, a
defendant's claim that a jury-selection process different from the one
employed in his case might result in the selection of a jury generally
more favorably disposed toward him, would be unsuccessful unless the
defendant could show that the individual jurors actually chosen were
unconstitutionally biased against him.A3 Witherspoon did not change
this rule. Indeed, Mr. Justice Stewart took pains to emphasize that the
Court was neither considering nor deciding anything with respect to a
claim premised on the assumption that the exclusion of jurors opposed
to capital punishment would significantly increase the risks of conviction. 1'7 4 Accordingly, if the Court were now to decide that a deathqualified jury significantly increased a defendant's risk of conviction,
a veniremen's expressed opinion is one reliable index which may be utilized for the purpose of defining a legally cognizable group. Viewed in this light, a holding that the selection of a death-qualified jury excludes a legally cognizable group could justifiably be
accepted as expounding new constitutional doctrine. See notes 93-110 and accompanying

text supra.
172 Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 518 (1968).
178 See Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
174 391 U.S. at 520 n.18 (emphasis in original):
[A] defendant convicted by ... a jury [selected pursuant to a post-Witherspoon
test] in some future case might still attempt to establish that the jury was less
than neutral with respect to guilt. If he were to succeed in that effort, the question would then arise whether the State's interest in submitting the penalty issue
to a jury capable of imposing capital punishment may be vindicated at the expense of the defendant's interest in a completely fair determination of guilt or
innocence-given the possibility of accommodating both interests by means of a
bifurcated trial, using one jury to decide guilt and another to fix punishment.
That problem is not presented here, however, and we intimate no view as to its
proper resolution.
In response, a defendant might argue that invalidation of a conviction reached by a deathqualified jury on these grounds is merely a new application of an old principle, i.e., in
a criminal case a defendant has a constitutional right to a trial before an impartial finder
of fact. See, e.g., Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927) (invalidating conviction rendered by
judge who had interest in outcome of case). Indeed, Witherspoon's reliance on Glasser
might lend support to such an argument.
A conclusion that an invalidation of a conviction reached by a death-qualified jury
is merely a new application of an existing constitutional principle is initially appealing;
however, it is seriously flawed. In deciding Witherspoon, the Court indicated that the
decision announced a new constitutional doctrine. 391 U.S. at 523 n.22. The carefully
phrased dictum of the Court, admitting that a conviction handed down by a death-qualified jury might be invalid, was part of that decision. Accordingly, that dictum was also
part of the new constitutional rule.

1210

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:1176

it would be breaking new constitutional ground and the retroactivity
of such a decision would be in doubt.
3.

The Claim that the Defendant's Right to Equal ProtectionHas
Been Violated

A holding that the existence of a dual system of jury selection constitutes a denial of equal protection to the group of defendants who are
subjected to death-qualified juries would probably constitute a new
application of the constitutional principle announced by the Court in
Fay v. New York.'75 It would also constitute a clear application of the
well-established rule that, absent a compelling state interest, a state
may not establish a classification which infringes upon fundamental
rights. 7 6 In applying this constitutional rule to new factual situations,
the Court has never suggested that a finding of a new invidious classification results in a new constitutional decision. On the contrary, in
the one instance in which the Court faced this question, the claim that
a far-reaching application of the equal protection clause should be
treated as a new constitutional principle was impliedly rejected without
discussion. In Smith v. Crause,'177 the Kansas Supreme Court had held
that Douglas v. California'7 8 should not be retroactively applied to convictions which were finalized prior to the effective date of Douglas.7 9
In reversing per curiam, the Supreme Court merely cited the Douglas
decision.ls ° This apparently indicates that the Court did not view
Douglas as establishing new constitutional doctrine but rather as a
new application of preexisting constitutional principles.' 8 ' Since the
constitutional principle applicable in Douglas would support an equal
protection holding in the present case, a decision that a dual system of
jury selection denies equal protection to defendants in capital cases
would not constitute a new decision in the constitutional sense. 82
175 332 U.S. 261 (1947).
176 See, e.g., Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex Tel.
Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
177 192 Kan. 171, 386 P.2d 295 (1963).
178 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
179 192 Kan. at 179, 286 P.2d at 301.
180 Smith v. Crause, 378 U.S. 584 (1964).
181 Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316
U.S. 535 (1942).

182 Since Smith was decided prior to Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965), the
first Supreme Court ruling to apply a new constitutional decision prospectively, it might
be argued that when Smith was handed down the Court did not consider it appropriate
to apply a new constitutional doctrine prospectively. However, since the lower court expressly based its ruling on a prospective application of Douglas, the Supreme Court's re-
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Thus, although the question is certainly not free from doubt, any
holding that convictions rendered by death-qualified juries are constitutionally invalid could reasonably be considered a new application of
preexisting constitutional doctrine. 18 3 If so, then the holding would
require retroactive effect.
B.

The Problem of Retroactivity

1. The Test for Determining the Retroactivity of a New ConstitutionalDecision
In determining whether a new constitutional rule should be given

retroactive or merely prospective effect, the Supreme Court has created
a three-part analysis:
The criteria guiding resolution of the question implicate (a) the
purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards, and (c)
the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive appli84
cation of the new standards.
In assaying the purpose to be served by a new constitutional standard, a primary consideration emphasized by the courts is the extent
to which the new rule was designed to remove a defect in the factfinding process. 8 5 Whereas new decisions which are primarily designed
fusal even to mention the word "retroactivity" in its affirmance seems to support the read-

ing of the case suggested in the text.
The state could respond that although its interest in obtaining a death penalty was
illusory (see text accompanying note 151 supra), the presence of this apparently valid interest at the time of the defendant's trial constituted a reasonable basis for distinguishing
this invidious classification from those situations in which the state never had even an
illusory interest. However, even assuming that the state's illusory interest in obtaining a
death sentence was valid, it is still questionable whether this interest could be considered
compelling, especially in view of the fact that the state could safeguard this interest by
the less restrictive alternative of "using one jury to decide guilt and another to fix punishment." Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 520 n.18 (1968).
183 With respect to the claim that the practice of obtaining a death-qualified jury
operates as an indirect systematic exclusion of black veniremen, a defendant could argue
that the acceptance of this claim would constitute nothing more than an application of
the principle articulated in Strauder and amplified in cases such as Hill v. Texas, 816
U.S. 400 (1972), and Labat v. Bennett, 365 F.2d 698 (5th Cir. 1966). Again, however, the
prosecution could assert that the special circumstances of the exclusionary system sufficiently distinguish this case from prior cases to assert that a new constitutional principle
is being established.
184 Stovall v. Denno, 888 U.S. 293, 297 (1967) (dictum); see Linkletter v. Walker, 381
U.S. 618, 629 (1965).
185 See, e.g., Berger v. California, 393 U.S. 314, 315 (1969) (per curiam); Roberts v.
Russell, 392 U.S. 293, 294 (1968) (per curiam); Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 523
n.22 (1968).
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to deter improper police conduct are almost invariably afforded only
prospective effect, 8 6 constitutional innovations in the adversary process itself are generally given retroactive application because of their
significant potential for safeguarding the innocent by improving the
integrity of the fact-finding process. 8 7 Moreover, in applying the threepart test, the determination of whether the purpose of the new doctrine
relates to the fact-finding process has been identified as by far the most
significant:
Where the major purpose of new constitutional doctrine is to
overcome an aspect of the criminal trial that substantially impairs
its truth-finding function and so raises serious questions about the
accuracy of guilty verdicts in past trials, the new rule has been
given complete retroactive effect. Neither good-faith reliance by
state or federal authorities on prior constitutional law or accepted
practice, nor severe impact on the administration of justice has
88
sufficed to require prospective application in these circumstances.
Thus, the enunciated principles relating to retroactivity apparently indicate that a new decision invalidating convictions rendered by a
death-qualified jury must be given retroactive effect if it is found that
the decision removes a substantial impediment to the fact-finding process.
2. The Effect of the New Rule on the Fact-FindingProcess
A decision holding that convictions rendered by a death-qualified
jury are invalid will almost inevitably be premised upon a finding that
the exclusion of jurors opposed to capital punishment creates a con186 See, e.g., Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967) (requirement that police provide
counsel at post-indictment lineup); Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966) (requirement that police warn defendants of constitutional rights in pretrial interrogation); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965) (application of exclusionary rule).
187 See, e.g., cases cited in note 185 supra. Of course, a finding that the new constitutional rule improves the fact-finding process is not the only basis upon which the Supreme
Court will apply a new rule retroactively. As the Fourth Circuit stated in United States
v. Miller, 406 F.2d 1100, 1103 (4th Cir. 1969):
The Court's emphasis in its retroactivity decisions on the importance of
reliable fact-finding procedures is simply one frequently articulated aspect of its
concern that all convictions past and present shall be the product of fundamentally
fair proceedings.
At least two of the recent circuit court decisions which have applied new constitutional doctrines retroactively do not seem to have been premised upon a need to improve
the reliability of the fact-finding process. See Edmaiston v. Neil, 452 F.2d 494 (6th Cir.
1971) (retroactive application of Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30 (1970), which articulated
new principles concerning state defendant's constitutional right to speedy trial); Mullreed
v. Kropp, 425 F.2d 1095 (6th Cir. 1970) (retroactive application of Benton v. Maryland,
395 U.S. 784 (1969), which held double jeopardy clause applicable to states).
188 Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646, 653 (1971).
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stitutionally significant increase in a defendant's chance of conviction.
By excluding those potential jurors, the defendant is not only being
deprived of a jury representing a proper cross-section of the community, he is also losing the benefit of being judged by a group which
would tend to be more favorable to him on the question of his guilt
or innocence.1 89 Such a system is prejudicial to a capital defendant for
two reasons. It places his fate in the hands of a jury that may be less
than impartial, and it places a burden on a capital defendant not
shared by defendants in noncapital cases. 90 Viewed in this light, a
ruling by the Supreme Court invalidating convictions rendered by
death-qualified juries could be applied retroactively even if it is considered a new constitutional doctrine.
In Jackson v. Denno'91 and Bruton v. United States,192 the Supreme
Court adopted new constitutional rules to guard against possible prejudice to defendants resulting from the inability of one or more jurors
to comply with a trial judge's cautionary instructions. 93 In holding
both rulings retroactive, 194 the Court never discussed the magnitude
of the potential prejudice eliminated as a result of the new rulings, but
merely emphasized that the decisions were calculated to remove a
" 'serious flaw in the fact-finding process at trial.' "195 The Court's analysis implies that rulings designed to eliminate prejudice in the actual adjudication of a case will automatically be given retroactive application.
If this is so, the exclusion of veniremen because of their opposition to
capital punishment presents an even stronger case for retroactive application than either Jackson or Bruton. Whereas both cases were designed to safeguard the fact-finding process by protecting jurors from
exposure to possibly prejudicial evidence, the present situation involves
a rule which is designed to remedy the more fundamental risk of inherent prejudice against criminal defendants.
Witherspoon itself provides further support for this analysis. In
189
190
191
192

See notes 66-89 and accompanying text supra.

See notes 131-50 and accompanying text supra.

378 U.S. 368 (1964).
391 U.S. 123 (1968).
193 In Jackson, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a procedure under which

the same jury which passed on guilt or innocence also determined the admissibility of a
defendant's confession. 378 U.S. at 388. In Bruton, the Court held that the admission at
a joint trial of a codefendant's confession which implicated the defendant violated the
defendant's sixth amendment right to confrontation. 391 U.S. at 126.
194 Jackson was held retroactive by implication in Owen v. Arizona, 378 U.S. 574
(1964) (per curiam). See also Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 638 (1965). Bruton was held
retroactive in Roberts v. Russell, 392 U.S. 293 (1968) (per curiam).
195 Roberts v. Russell, 392 U.S. 293, 294 (1968).
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holding its new constitutional rule retroactive, 196 the Court made no
attempt to assess the actual impact which the exclusion of particular
jurors would have on the outcome of the case. Rather, the Court emphasized "that the jury-selection standards employed here necessarily
undermined 'the very integrity of the . . . process' that decided the

[defendant's] fate."'1 7 Since a decision invalidating the exclusion of
jurors solely on the basis of their opposition to capital punishment
would be similar to Witherspoon in that a new procedure of jury selection would have to be devised to eliminate potential prejudice, the
above quoted language in Witherspoon presents another argument in
favor of affording the decision retroactive effect without any specific

examination of the precise extent to which the new doctrine will actually safeguard defendants from prejudice. 198
Moreover, a specific examination of the extent to which such a
new decision reduces prejudice further strengthens the argument in
favor of a retroactive holding. As noted, in close or doubtful cases, the

likely effect of holding both pre-Witherspoon and post-Witherspoon
exclusionary tests invalid would be to give the defendant an additional
vote for acquittal' 9 on the first ballot approximately twelve percent
of the time when he is being tried by a twelve man jury200 and almost six percent of the time when there is a six man jury. 201 Because
the vote on the first ballot is decisive in a large proportion of criminal
trials, 20 2 the addition of this vote for acquittal would undoubtedly have

made the crucial difference in many cases.
It is difficult to compare the probable impact of the hypothetical
ruling with that of the rules established in Jackson, Roberts, or Wither20 3
spoon. However, it seems fair to conclude that in certain situations

the hypothetical ruling's impact on the fact-finding process would be at
U.S. at 522-23.
Id. at 523 n.22.
198 It must be acknowledged that in determining whether Witherspoon should be
applied retroactively the Court did take into account both "the reliance of law enforcement officers" and the new rule's impact "on the administration of justice." Id; see notes
205-09 and accompanying text infra.
19 A more precise estimate of the likelihood of prejudice in a particular case may
be assessed by considering the exact number of veniremen excluded in that case. Cf. notes
230-32 and accompanying text infra. However, it will never be possible to calculate the
exact effect of an exclusionary rule on the outcome of any case.
200 See note 117 and accompanying text supra.
201 See note 118 and accompanying text supra.
202 See note 42 and accompanying text supra.
203 An example would be cases in which the elimination of the post-Witherspoon
exclusionary test actually led to the replacement of at least one juror who would vote for
conviction with one or more who would vote for acquittal.
196 391
I07
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least as great as the impact of any of those cases. The fact that there
may be some cases in which the application of the new rule would not
have affected the defendant's chances of acquittal should be consti4
tutionally irrelevant. 20
3. The Effect of Law Enforcement's Reliance on the Old Rule
Although the Supreme Court has indicated that a new constitutional rule's effect on the fact-finding process is of overriding importance, 20 5 the Court's decisions demonstrate that the question of retroactivity also involves a delicate balancing process in which a number
of factors must be afforded substantial consideration. 206 A retroactive
invalidation of all convictions rendered by death-qualified juries would
have dramatic (and to some, the most catastrophic) impact on the
administration of justice. Retrials (and in many cases, freedom) 207
would be required for not only the vast majority of those formerly on
death row, but also for thousands of prisoners who, although not sentenced to death, were nevertheless convicted of heinous crimes. 200 In
this extreme case, the impact on the administration of justice of the
new rule's fully retroactive application would seem to outweigh the
rule's salutary improvement on the integrity of the fact-finding process.
Although a fully retroactive application of the new rule may be
unacceptable, a totally prospective application is neither required nor
appropriate. 2 9 In determining an appropriate middle-ground between
these two extremes, the Supreme Court has identified a particularly
204 See note 131 supra. See also Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963). The inability of any particular defendant to establish that he was unfairly prejudiced by the
operation of a procedure which selected death-qualified jurors strengthens the argument
in favor of retroactivity because it provides a basis for claiming that there is no alternative
remedy available for defendants who were prejudiced and yet denied the effect of a new
constitutional ruling. As Justice Brennan has noted, an evaluation of the Court's prospective ruling shows that "in all cases save Tehan and DeStefano/Duncan, alternate methods
were still available to those who could demonstrate that the feared injustice had in fact
resulted." United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 730 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring).
205 See note 188 and accompanying text supra.
200 Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297 (1967).
207 Of course, because of the serious nature of the cases involved, prosecutors would
be likely to preserve the evidence if possible. Thus, the chances that the reversal of a conviction in a capital case would lead to automatic freedom (without the possibility of a
retrial) might be reduced.
208 See note 153 supra.
209 In many of the cases in which the Court adopted an essentially prospective rule,
the new rule was still applied to conduct which took place prior to the rule's announcement. See, e.g., Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 733 (1966) (constitutional rule announced in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 486 (1966), applicable in all pre-Miranda cases
in which defendant had not yet been brought to trial).
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significant factor: "[t]he extent of the reliance by law enforcement
authorities on the old standards."-210 That reliance will, in turn, depend
upon whether the particular case in question was tried pre-Witherspoon, post-Witherspoon but pre-Furman,or post-Furman.
a. Pre-Witherspoon Cases. With respect to all pre-Witherspoon
cases, the state's reliance interest is very strong. Prior to the Court's
ruling in that case, states reasonably believed that the exclusion of
veniremen opposed to capital punishment was permissible for the purpose of safeguarding the state's legitimate interest in obtaining death
sentences in appropriate cases. 21 Although Witherspoon held that the
state's interest does not justify the exclusion of this group, the Witherspoon majority's admission that a new constitutional rule was announced in that case 212 negates any claim that law enforcement agencies' reliance on the constitutional validity of the pre-Witherspoon
practice was unreasonable. Accordingly, with respect to these cases, a
state's argument against a retroactive invalidation of convictions rendered by death-qualified juries is relatively strong.
b. Post-Witherspoon, Pre-Furman Cases. The Witherspoon majority's "thinly veiled warning to the States"213 that exclusion of any
veniremen opposed to capital punishment might render the jury incapable of rendering an impartial verdict as to guilt 21 4 substantially
undermines any justifiable reliance by the state with respect to the continued use of a death-qualified jury. Although the state may plausibly
assert that exclusions pursuant to a post-Witherspoon test were justified
for the purpose of maintaining its apparently legitimate interest in
selecting a jury capable of imposing a capital sentence, Witherspoon
provided the state with explicit notice that a defendant convicted by a
jury selected pursuant to this exclusionary test might successfully invalidate his conviction by "establish[ing] that the jury was less than
neutral with respect to guilt." 215 In view of this warning, it would seem
appropriate to hold that states which continued the practice of excluding veniremen pursuant to a post-Witherspoon test did not do so with
justifiable reliance on the constitutional validity of the practice, but
210 Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297 (1967) (dictum).
211 It must be acknowledged, however, that in some post-Witherspoon cases state
courts allowed exclusions which seemed to go far beyond what was appropriate for the
purpose of protecting this interest. See, e.g., In re Anderson, 69 Cal. 2d 613, 447 P.2d 117,
73 Cal. Rptr. 21 (1968).
212 391 U.S. at 523 n.22.
213 Id. at 539 (Black, J., dissenting).
214 This warning applied with respect to the exclusion of veniremen pursuant to
either a pre-Witherspoon test (id. at 518) or a post-Witherspoon one. Id. at 520 n.18.
215

Id. at 520 n.18.
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rather with knowledge that they were taking a calculated risk "that
their murder convictions [had] been obtained unconstitutionally." 21
c. Post-Furman Cases. In post-Furman cases, convictions rendered
pursuant to a discretionary sentencing procedure must be distinguished
from those rendered pursuant to a mandatory statute. With respect to
the former, Furman's unequivocal holding that no death sentence may
be validly imposed in such cases 217 negates any plausible reliance interest on the part of law enforcement officials.
With respect to convictions rendered pursuant to a mandatory
capital statute, law enforcement agencies may still assert a reliance
interest on the ground that a death-qualified jury is necessary to enforce the state's interest in obtaining capital sentences.218 This interest,
however, is undercut by two factors. First, as in all post-Witherspoon
cases, the state is on notice that convictions rendered by death-qualified
juries may be constitutionally invalid.2 19 Second, Furman's holding
provides notice that a death penalty imposed pursuant to a statute
imposing mandatory capital punishment may still be unconstitutional. 220 While the constitutionality of mandatory capital punishment
is beyond the scope of this Article, it must be emphasized that no member of the Furman majority stated or implied that any form of mandatory capital punishment would be acceptable. 221 Two members of the
Court clearly indicated that any form of capital punishment would be
unacceptable, 222 and Mr. Chief Justice Burger, speaking for all four
dissenting Justices, expressed his fear that the Court's rationale would
uphold the constitutionality of mandatory capital sentencing only
if legislatures provided mandatory death sentences in such a way
as to deny juries the opportunity to bring in a verdict on a lesser
charge; under such a system, the223death sentence could only be
avoided by a verdict of acquittal.
Thus, the serious doubt as to the constitutional validity of most, if not
218 Id. at 539 (Black, J., dissenting).
217 See note 3 supra. See also Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 800 (1972) (interpreting

Furman as invalidating state statutes allowing discretionary imposition of death penalty).
218 The state's interest in a mandatory death penalty is slightly different. Because
there can be no bifurcation of the issues of guilt and sentencing, there is no means by
which the state's interest in obtaining the death penalty and the defendant's interest in
obtaining "a completely fair determination of guilt or innocence" can both be accommodated. See Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 520 n.18 (1968).
219 See notes 213-16 and accompanying text supra.
220 See notes 221-24 and accompanying text infra.
221 See note 2 supra.
222 See note 2 supra.
223 408 U.S. at 401 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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all, 224 mandatory capital sentence statutes provides notice to the state
that there may be no legitimate governmental interest in obtaining a
death sentence pursuant to one of these statutes. This notice, compounded with the notice that verdicts rendered by death-qualified juries
in post-Witherspoon cases may be unconstitutional, renders the state's
reliance argument extremely weak in this class of cases.
C.

A Proposed Rule of Retroactivity
If it is held that convictions rendered by a death-qualified jury

are constitutionally invalid, the decision will be one of extraordinarily
high public visibility. Since the courts are undoubtedly political institutions, ultimately subject to the will of the people, it is appropriate to
consider the effect of the rule on public opinion. Although an argument
225
can be made in favor of affording complete retroactivity to the rule,
the political implications of this result render it inadvisable, if not unthinkable. Similarly, a rule which would distinguish between pre-

Witherspoon and post-Witherspoon, pre-Furman cases might also have
unfortunate political consequences, since the judiciary might appear to
be affording disparate treatment to defendants who are essentially

similarly situated.

226

In order to obtain an optimum balance between limiting the adverse political consequences of the new rule and safeguarding the
rights of both past and future defendants, the Court should hold
that in pre-Furman cases, 227 convictions rendered by death-qualified
juries will be invalidated only upon a showing of substantial prejudice.2 28 In applying the test of substantial prejudice, two factors should
224 See note 2 supra.
225 See notes 151-204 and accompanying text supra.
226 Thus, the political viability of the new rule announced in Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 456 (1966), was not enhanced by the Court's decision to apply the rule to four
defendants while refusing to apply it to more than one hundred other defendants with apparently indistinguishable cases before the Court. See generally F. GRRA-HA,
THE SELFINFLICTED WOUND 161 (1970).
227 In cases of post-Furman convictions rendered by death-qualified juries with discretionary sentencing authority, a fully retroactive application of the new constitutional
rule seems appropriate in view of the absence of any legitimate state reliance on the old
rule. See text accompanying notes 217-24 supra. The proper disposition of convictions
rendered by death-qualified juries acting pursuant to a mandatory capital punishment
statute is beyond the scope of this Article. See note 16 supra.
228 For example, in United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968), the Court invalidated
the death penalty provision of the Federal Kidnapping Act (18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (1970)), and
held that in granting the right to impose capital punishment exclusively to the jury which
convicted the defendant, the Act placed an impermissible burden on the defendant's right
to a jury trial. However, in Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970), the Court held that
a guilty plea entered in a pre-Jackson case would not be rendered invalid merely on a
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be evaluated. First, the court should consider the number of excluded
veniremen. Although there is no precise correlation between the number of excluded veniremen and the extent to which any particular defendant is prejudiced, 229 clearly the likelihood of prejudice increases

as more veniremen are excluded. Appropriate distinctions may be
drawn between cases involving the elimination of only a few veniremen 23 0 and those in which many were excluded. 23 1 However, since the
ultimate test is one of substantial prejudice, no precise numerical lines
need be drawn. Since the exclusion of any given number of veniremen
will be likely to have more impact in a close or doubtful case, 232 an
examination of the trial record should also be required. When an
examination of the record indicates that the evidence was probably
such as to denote a significant doubt as to the outcome, the exclusion
of even a few veniremen should be sufficient to invalidate the conviction. When a doubt as to the outcome decreases, an increased number
of improper exclusions should be required for reversal. Finally, in
pre-Furman cases, courts should automatically refuse to reverse convictions in which the evidence of guilt was so overwhelming as to afford
no substantial basis for believing that the unconstitutional system of
3
jury selection could have affected the outcome.2 3
While not easy to apply, this approach would come close to striking
an optimum balance between the various competing interests. Without
mandating the wholesale release of persons already convicted of vicious
crimes, the approach would apply a principled rule which would differentiate cases, not on the basis of arbitrary distinctions relating to
the time of a particular event, but rather on the basis of prejudice to
the defendant, a concern far more justifiable. Moreover, through such
an approach, future defendants would be protected from an unconshowing that the plea would not have been entered except for the existence of the provision
of the federal statute held invalid in Jackson.
229 See notes 117-18 and accompanying text supra.
230 See, e.g., Marion v. Beto, 434 F.2d 29 (5th Cir. 1971).
231 See, e.g., People v. Speck, 41 Ill. 2d 177, 242 N.E.2d 208 (1968), revd per curiam,
403 U.S. 946 (1971).
232 See notes 34-36 and accompanying text supra.
233 Cf. United States ex tel. Johnson v. Rundle, 349 F.2d 416 (3d Cir. 1965); United
States ex rel. Rucker v. Myers, 311 F.2d 311 (3d Cir. 1963); United States ex rel. Scoleri v.
Banmiller, 310 F.2d 720 (3d Cir. 1962). In these cases, the Third Circuit utilized a standard of substantial prejudice to determine whether the prejudice to a defendant from the
introduction of his prior criminal record in a unitary criminal trial was sufficient to constitute a denial of due process. Subsequently, the Supreme Court removed the necessity for
this approach by holding that the admission of a prior criminal record in a trial would not
ordinarily give rise to a due process claim. Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554 (1967); cf. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
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stitutional jury selection process, while the most egregious injustices of
the past would be corrected.
CONCLUSION

The dissent in Thompson v. State 34 vividly portrayed the effect
of the use of death-qualified juries:
To automatically discharge all prospective jurors because they have
conscientious scruples against capital punishment is the equivalent
of stacking the jury in favor of the prosecution and against the
defendant. It is just as rational to excuse for cause all prospective
jurors who favor capital punishment, all Negroes because the
accused is black, or all white women because the victim is a white
woman ...
.. . To exclude one group because of a certain philosophy,

destroys the common sense, sensitivity and balance of the venire.235
By confirming the essential validity of these observations, the results
from the post-Witherspoon studies form the basis for several strong
constitutional arguments in favor of holding that convictions rendered
by the exclusion of veniremen opposed to capital punishment are constitutionally invalid.
The implications of these arguments have tremendous significance
not only with respect to future prosecutorial attempts to obtain a death
penalty, but also with respect to prior convictions rendered by deathqualified juries. If the arguments are accepted, a court will be confronted with the delicate task of determining precisely which prior
convictions must be invalidated. Although the formulation of an appropriate rule is difficult, involving a balancing of political as well as
legal considerations, the adoption of the approach suggested in this
Article should yield a satisfactory and just result.
234 246 So. 2d 760 (Fla. 1971).

235 Id. at 766 (Revels, J., dissenting).

